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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Chain-Link Fence Model: A Framework for Creating 
Security Procedures 
 
 
By 
 
 
Robert F. Houghton, 
Utah State University, 2013 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Zsolt Ugray 
Department: MIS 
 
 
 A long standing problem in information technology 
security is how to help reduce the security footprint. Many 
specific proposals exist to address specific problems in 
information technology security. Most information 
technology solutions need to be repeatable throughout the 
course of an information systems lifecycle. 
 The Chain-Link Fence Model is a new model for creating 
and implementing information technology procedures. This 
model was validated by two different methods: the first 
being interviews with experts in the field of information 
technology and the second being four distinct case studies 
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demonstrating the creation and implementation of 
information technology procedures.    
(169 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
     Information technology security professionals are 
facing an ever growing threat to the networks that they 
defend. The process for creating procedures to help stem 
this threat is very difficult for security professionals. 
The Chain-Link Fence Model helps security professionals by 
guiding them through the process of creating and 
implementing new security procedures. 
Robert F. Houghton 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
In the early days of management information systems, 
network security was not thought of as a necessity because 
little threat existed. The only computers were mainframe 
computers, so users only had remote terminal access to run 
programs. As computers got smaller, dumb terminals were 
replaced by microcomputers, which eventually evolved into 
personal computers on every single desk. All those 
computers were eventually joined together to form the first 
intra-office computer networks. By the mid-1980s, the 
DARPAnet had evolved from a closed, wide-area computer 
network consisting of universities and military 
organizations into the internet (ARPANET, 2012), which is a 
series of networked computers that are based on open 
communication protocols to which anyone can join. 
Applications which run on the internet include email, file 
transfer protocol, and the World Wide Web. In 1990, CERN 
invented the World Wide Web 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_wide_web, para. 3). The 
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World Wide Web is an application which uses, at its core, 
open standards including hypertext transfer protocol to 
display text and graphics. The World Wide Web brought forth 
open communication between organizations and people in 
general. Customers could place orders directly into a 
company’s computer systems, suppliers and vendors could use 
shared intranets to keep track of inventory, and library 
catalogs could be accessed by academics anywhere in the 
world. This openness and free flow of information would 
come at a cost, however, as the very system which was the 
new “information superhighway” also became an “unpoliced 
back alley” (A. Beckett, 2009) for malicious programmers 
and hobbyist hackers.  
The first major computer security threat was in 1971 
(Creeper, 2012). It was the first self-replicating program, 
later known as a “virus,” called The Creeper. It displayed 
the text, “I am The Creeper. Catch me if you can.”  Because 
computers were not as networked together, viruses were 
transferred disk-to-disk by what is now known as a 
sneakernet: a user would unknowingly take a virus-infected 
disk and insert it into a computer, which would then become 
infected. Any disk put in an infected computer would become 
infected, and an infected disk would infect any computer 
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with which it came in contact. In 1988, the Morris Worm 
(Morris Worm, 2012) was the first virus to use the internet 
to self-replicate and infect multiple computers. It 
infected 6,000 computers, which at the time, was ten 
percent of all of the computers connected to the internet. 
The government estimated the damages to be between $10 
million and $100 million. In 1999 the Happy99, Melissa 
Worm, ExploreZip, and Sub7 viruses permeated the World Wide 
Web and email (Backhouse, Hsu, & Silva, 2006). The viruses 
had become so widespread and damaging that it became 
painfully obvious to the Information Technology (IT) 
community that network security procedures and systems were 
needed. 
In 1989, the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) started an IT security awareness campaign 
called "keep IT safe" (Backhouse et al, 2006 p. 418). By 
1990 this campaign was recognized throughout Europe. The 
first European conference on IT security was held in 1992 
(Backhouse et al, 2006). The nations of France, Germany, 
The United Kingdom, and The Netherlands formed the first 
European multi-national security taskforce, called the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), from which a subgroup was formed, called the 
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European Security Forum (Backhouse et al, 2006). “There 
were three of us at the [first] meeting [of the European 
Security Forum]: the security manager, his director, and 
myself. At the end of the meeting, we agreed to bring 
together our key contacts who had expressed interest in 
security standards in formal and informal meetings. This 
decision was a very significant step forward in this 
context” (Backhouse et al, 2006 p. 419).  
In 1992 the DTI published a report called Security 
Breaches Survey (Backhouse et al., 2006), which concluded 
that UK businesses were losing £1.1 billion annually 
because of computer security breaches. In 1993 the Abraxas 
virus, the first major virus that was automatically 
generated by virus-generating software, was the spark that 
started the standardization process. Seven UK businesses 
were involved in drafting the code:  BOC group, British 
Telecommunication, Marks and Spencer, Midland Bank, 
Nationwide Building Society, Shell International Petroleum, 
Shell UK, and Unilever (Backhouse et al., 2006). All 
representatives were high-level security managers. The 
first draft of what would become industry standard BS7799 
was written in only 3 months. It was called “A Code of 
Practice for Information Security Management,” (Backhouse 
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et al., 2006) and it became an immediate bestseller for the 
British Standards Institute. “There was a significant 
amount of interest in both DISC and BS7799,” a high-level 
security manager interviewed at the time reported. “My 
company was an IT consulting company, and after both 
publications were released, and in particular after BS7799, 
we received a lot of inquiries about BS7799 implementation” 
(Backhouse et al., 2006, p. 421). Over 10,000 copies were 
sold in September 1993. The transition from a draft into a 
ratified standard took place between 1993 and 1995. In 1999 
BS7799 was proposed as an International Standards 
Organization (ISO) standard. This was changed to ISO 
17799:2000 on December 1 2000 (Backhouse et al., 2006). 
In 1991, computer security breaches cost U.S. 
companies 5.5 billion dollars. By 2006, that number was 
projected to have reached $25 billion (Gal-Or & Ghose, 
2005). On October 16, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush 
issued executive order 13231, titled “Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age” (Bush, 
2001). This executive order specifically called for the 
implementation of “a voluntary public-private partnership, 
involving corporate and non-governmental organizations.”  
The partnership was tasked with protecting information 
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systems infrastructures from disruption or damage. Out of 
this initiative came the Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT). The group was focused on free sharing of computer 
security information, and that led disastrously to what 
Next Generation Software Services claimed was a “violation 
of trust because information was leaked to potential 
competitors” (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005 p. 187). NGSS severed 
ties with CERT, providing a glaring example of the failure 
of open communication in resolving security issues. Because 
of this failure the U.S. market shifted from a governmental 
policing system to an internal business security system. As 
a result, many American companies began following the 
guidelines set forth in ISO17799:2000.  
Every U.S. organization, including each university, is 
now responsible for its own information security and is 
liable for any breaches. According to data collected from 
the border firewall flow reports, thousands of Internet-
based attacks every second bombard the Utah State 
University (USU) campus computing community. The 
implication is that a poorly managed computer with basic 
security deficiencies can be infected within seconds of 
connecting to the campus network. A single infected 
computer is a hazard to the rest of the campus. USU is such 
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a large, complex environment that demands standardized 
computer security policies and procedures. A visual 
timeline of the proceeding events is located in the 
appendices (see Appendix A). In February 2008, Utah State 
University adopted Computer Management Policy 551, which 
stated, “All computers connected to the USU Network must be 
configured and managed to reduce or eliminate the risk of 
loss of control of the computer resource or the stored or 
transmitted information.”  The policy mandated university 
IT to “develop Computer Management Procedures according to 
industry best practices in collaboration with IT advisory 
committees and user groups” 
(http://it.usu.edu/policies/htm/computer-management-policy, 
para. 2). 
The policy was a good starting point, but without 
accompanying procedures and recommendations, the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) and the USU Central IT Security 
Team felt it was only a façade of security. In August 2009, 
a task force was organized for the purpose of creating 
security procedures which could be enacted to fulfill the 
requirements of Computer Management Policy 551. The task 
force comprised volunteers from the campus-wide network 
managers group. The task force faced a special challenge: 
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An endeavor like this could not simultaneously be broad 
enough to account for all computing environments and 
situations and focused enough to protect the computers most 
at risk. The task force also faced the challenge of 
acceptance and implementation of its procedures. If the 
recommendations were too specific, their application could 
be deemed too rigid, regularly irrelevant, and rapidly 
obsolete. A small, vocal group of campus IT stakeholders 
expressed concern at the university Network Managers 
meeting that the official procedures could be used to 
override in-the-field expertise. Others expressed concern 
that a restrictive policy would equate to restrictions on 
academic freedom. On the other hand, if the recommendations 
were too vague, their application could be deemed regularly 
ineffective, confusing, and even meaningless.  
The creation of these procedures took place between 
August 2009 and March 2010. The task force (Okelberry & 
Houghton, 2010) comprised representatives of three major 
colleges, two members of the university central IT 
department, and one member from the business and finance 
department. This task force met weekly to determine the 
scope of systems to be included in the management, the size 
of the number of recommendations, and the process of 
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determining the specific recommendations. The task force 
thought that there were four specific types of computer 
systems that composed the bulk of the campus network. They 
were computers that used Microsoft Windows operating 
systems for high security transactions, specifically users 
that handled monetary transactions or student records; 
computers that used Apple Mac OS X for high security 
transactions; computers that used Microsoft Windows for 
routine use; and computers that used Apple Mac OS X for 
routine use. 
The final draft was presented to the university 
management, IT professionals, and the general public at the 
March 2010 network managers meeting. The procedures were 
approved by majority, voice vote and went into effect March 
15, 2010 (Okelberry & Houghton, 2010). 
Throughout this process the task force went to great 
lengths to ensure that the final recommendations were 
accurate, dependable, and most importantly, secure. Users 
of university networks were demanding more and more 
features to support the myriad of new devices that they 
were using to communicate. The task force realized early on 
in the process that it needed to limit the scope in order 
to accomplish the goal of creating the computer security 
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procedures. However in going forward, there would be a need 
for further computer security policies and procedures as 
always-available communications, on-demand television, and 
completely connected devices became the standard use of 
computer networks.  
 As the issue of computer and network security was 
ever-changing, there needed to be a streamlined method for 
creating policies and procedures without having to start 
over from scratch each time. This methodology needed to be 
created, documented, and followed to help give uniformity 
and accuracy to future procedures. 
The Chain-Link Fence Model, created by the author, is 
a resulting methodology for creating information security 
procedures. It consists of four components: Buy-In, Ease-
of-Use, Implementation, and Effectiveness. The components 
operate in this order:  First, one must create Buy-In needs 
before the procedure can be approved. Next, the procedure 
is introduced to the users. Ease-of-Use is a major 
determinant of whether or not the procedure will be 
followed. Computer managers generally handle the software 
configuration and training included in Implementation. 
Lastly, Effectiveness is measured by an audit system. 
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Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this research is to create a framework 
from which future security policies and procedures can be 
created. Additionally, this research seeks to establish how 
to encourage universal adoption of and adherence to the 
framework, both by designing the framework to be acceptable 
to the strong majority of users and by shaping the 
organizational culture of an hierarchical organization into 
a culture of security. Furthermore, this develops and 
refines the Chain-Link Fence Model and assesses how it 
increases the quality of the creation, implementation, and 
effectiveness of security policies and procedures in a 
hierarchical organization. 
Conceptual Framework 
In the creation of these new security procedures 
recommendations, the author relied on the guidance of 
theories from the studies of communication and 
organizational culture.  
The theory of Competing Values Model of Organization 
Culture was adapted to fit the task force's goals. This 
theory, proposed by Iivari and Huisman (2007), states that 
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an organization can be classified into one of four main 
cultures:   
1. Group culture: change, internal focus. Human 
relationships and flexibility 
2. Development culture: change, external focus. Future 
oriented, considering what might be 
3. Rational culture: stability, external focus. 
Achievement oriented, focused on productivity 
4. Hierarchical culture: stability, internal focus. 
Security, order, routing, following regulations 
(Iivari & Huisman, 2007, p. 37) 
When presented with these points during its meetings, the 
task force members agreed that Utah State University fit 
within the Hierarchical culture classification. In 
accordance with the organizational culture model, the task 
force concluded that they would need to achieve a level of 
Buy-In among information systems (IS) administrators from 
all units around the institution in order to accomplish its 
goal of creating a system of security for Utah State 
University. The theory helped shape the focus of the task 
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force and its goals by giving specific methods to present 
the proposed security procedures. 
Several themes emerged from the review of the task 
force meeting notes. These themes were interwoven into a 
model to help define information systems security as a 
whole for hierarchical institutions. These themes became 
components of the Chain-Link Fence Model of Information 
Systems Security. This study analyzes and validates the 
Chain-Link Fence Model of Information System Security 
Policy and Procedure Creation. 
Original Contribution 
The contribution to the general IS knowledge base of 
this research is the development, validation, and analysis 
of the Chain-Link Fence Model of creating Information 
System Security Procedures. After reviewing relevant 
literature to date, no other comprehensive framework has 
been established to observe this procedure in a large 
organizational setting. 
Layout of the Dissertation 
The first section is a review of literature explaining 
the history and current state of information technology 
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security as well as a look into the creation of policy, 
procedures, or industry standards. Next is the presentation 
of the Chain-Link Fence Model, the full description, and 
its development. The third section is the establishment of 
the methods and procedures followed by the researcher. This 
includes the timeline of events and the study design 
consisting of two parts: 1) deep interviews with three 
members of the university information technology department 
and 2) the case study interviews with four lab managers. 
The following section outlines the development of the 
Chain-Link Fence Model. This includes the history of 
security at Utah State University, creation of security 
procedures, the need for replication, the formulation of 
components, and how it links to prior research. 
This study next reports the specifics of the deep 
interviews. In part one of the study, three subjects 
discussed their experience with components of the Chain-
Link Fence Model and how it helped develop the new USU 
security procedures. Part two presents the validation of 
the model as a whole. Four start-to-finish case studies 
validate the entire model. Finally the study concludes with 
the summary of findings, a discussion of any weakness of 
the study, and a call for further research.   
15 
 
 
   
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Many studies have been conducted on a wide range of 
topics to help information security professionals obtain 
their goals of mitigating security threats in their own 
organizations. In order to help future security 
professionals, it is important to see the current state of 
research into information technology security. This 
literature review looks into research in the field of 
information technology security. 
The objectives for this literature review are: 
1. to explore the evolution of information technology 
security; 
2. to discuss the research into the creation of policy, 
procedures, or industry standards, the results of 
that research, and their effect on information 
technology security; and 
3. to discuss conclusions drawn by previous research. 
Review Procedures 
In order to sort the broad array of topics found in 
the search, the papers were coded using a system developed 
to help identify the type and conclusion of the study. 
Based upon the coding system, the papers were included in 
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or discarded from this review. The papers included in this 
review all have characteristics that relate to the creation 
of security policy and procedure. 
Locating the Papers 
Papers were located using a search of JSTORE, Business 
Source Premier, and Google Scholar. Ninety-eight papers 
were identified that are relevant for this research via 
this search. The author’s discussion with his major 
professor led to another recent paper. From this paper two 
other references were obtained. 
The keywords for the Internet searches are as follows: 
Management information security, security policy, security 
policy creation, security procedures, security procedures 
creation, information technology security, technology 
security management, Internet security policy, Internet 
security procedures, network security, management network 
security, network security policy creation. The papers 
included in this review needed to meet the following 
criteria: 
1. they needed to be referenced by a scholarly source 
or 
2. they needed to be referenced by two other papers 
17 
 
 
   
 
that met the first criteria. 
This process identified 95 papers for reference in this 
review. 
The History and Current State of Information Technology 
Security 
Mustonen-Ollila and Lyytinen (2003) studied IS process 
innovation from 1940 through 1997. Their paper gave a brief 
history of information technology. It addressed the issues 
that faced information technology professionals including 
the beginnings of information security. Due to the nature 
of the research, a case study methodology was used. They 
identified four generations: Gen 1 (1940-1960) dealt mostly 
with hardware constraints, Gen 2 (1960-1980) dealt with 
software constraints, Gen 3 (1980-1990) dealt with user 
relationships and Gen 4 (1990-present) dealt with 
organizational constraints. “The most important items in 
these factors observed to influence adoptions were: user 
need recognition, technological infrastructure, past 
technological experience, own trials, autonomous work, ease 
of use, learning by doing and standards” (Mustonen-Ollila 
and Lyytinen, 2003, p. 293). 
Overall, IS process innovations are expected to 
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improve the quality and productivity of IS 
development where the products – ISs – are 
defined as systems of hardware and software 
capable of digital information storage, 
processing and communication that can serve some 
organizational functions or purposes. (Mustonen-
Ollila and Lyytinen, 2003, p. 276) 
  
One of the largest constraints in developing security 
process was discussed by Kotulic and Clark (2004). They 
conducted a survey to determine whether their proposed 
security model would have any success. “Information 
security research is one of the most intrusive types of 
organization research, and there is undoubtedly a general 
mistrust of any ‘outsider’ attempting to gain data about 
the actions of the security practitioner community” 
(Kotulic and Clark, 2004, p. 604). The response rate to the 
questionnaire was 5.1%, which was statistically not enough 
to conduct an analysis. They surmised that the scope was 
too large and the population too diverse. 
Historically, threats and vulnerabilities have 
not been considered until after a security breach 
had occurred. The goal of risk management is to 
maximize possible gain while minimizing possible 
loss. The risk management process must be a cost-
effective, nontechnology driven, value creation 
process that contributes to the overall 
effectiveness of the organization. (Kotulic and 
Clark, 2004, p. 598)  
 
They also concluded that because of the secrecy nature of 
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IT, security companies were reluctant to share data.  
Firms are unwilling to divulge such information 
without strong assurances that the information 
provided will in no way harm them, yet could 
provide insight in how to improve their 
organization. Time is far better spent focusing 
on a few, select firms with whom the researcher 
has developed an excellent rapport and trust. 
(Kotulic and Clark, 2004, p. 605) 
 
They recommended further studies to advance the study of IT 
security. 
While actual security breaches are rarely reported, 
spyware (software written for the purpose of gaining 
information about their target) attacks have been widely 
reported and analyzed by researchers. Warkentin, Luo, and 
Templeton (2005) were among the first to discuss the rising 
threat of spyware to government and the resulting incentive 
for lawmakers to create anti-spyware laws.  
Many spyware components use the veiled approach 
of placing the intention to monitor notification 
within End User License Agreements (EULAs) 
immediately before the installation of other 
programs. But because users commonly accept the 
EULAs without being aware they are installing 
software that will monitor their activities, 
there may be consent without awareness, certainly 
not true informed consent. (Warkentin, Luo, and 
Templeton, 2005, p. 80) 
  
They comment that legislators do not fully understand the 
problem. “Confusion over spyware has caused many companies 
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to refrain from adequately implementing spyware solutions. 
Spyware is not understood as well as other security threats 
(such as P2P, viruses, worms, and hacking)” (Warkentin, Luo, 
and Templeton, 2005, p. 84). In conclusion, they ask, “Why 
are the distinctions between positive and negative 
consequences important? If legislators enact laws without 
clear specification, unintended outcomes could ensue” 
(Warkentin, Luo, and Templeton, 2005, p. 83). 
Most current businesses do not realize the potential 
for network security breaches. Herath and Rao (2009) stated, 
“We, however, found that the certainty of security breaches 
does not have a significant impact on the security concern” 
(Herath and Rao, 2009, p. 117). Along those lines, LaRose, 
Rifon, and Enbody (2008) stated that “four-fifths of all 
home computers lack one or more core protections against 
virus, hacker, and spyware threats” (LaRose, Rifon, and 
Enbody, 2008, p. 71). 
Sriramachandramurthy, Balasubramanian, and Hopis (2009) 
used a survey to determine how users protect themselves 
from spyware and adware.  
Spyware refers to applications that include 
adware which may be installed without an end-
user's consent, with the goal of tracking and 
collecting personal information without 
consent ... [We] define adware as computer-
21 
 
 
   
 
resident software applications that serve pop-up 
windows with advertisements that are not related 
to, or authorized by, the Web sites an individual 
chooses to visit. (Sriramachandramurthy, 
Balasubramanian, and Hopis, 2009, p. 42) 
  
They found that there are two main components to security: 
technical (firewalls, security software suites) and risk-
avoidance (not going to questionable websites, not using 
p2p software.) They hypothesized that users with a greater 
technical knowledge, greater security awareness, higher 
experience, and greater confidence in their own skills were 
more likely to use defensive measures to protect themselves 
and their computers. They found their hypotheses to be 
statistically valid. 
Vroom and von Solms (2004) detailed how IT auditing 
was currently working, namely auditing the validation of 
data. The authors stated that from IT auditing grew a 
subset called IS security auditing, which audits the 
policies and procedures of the organization and not just 
the technology. “As organizations have expanded globally, 
auditing the financial transactions only is no longer 
enough” (Vroom and von Solms, 2004, p. 192). The authors 
further stated that human factors were not being addressed.  
For example, if an unauthorized employee attempts 
to access information, the audit logs will record 
this. Unfortunately, it may go undetected until 
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the auditor reviews the documentation. The 
results of the employee’s behavior and actions 
have been detected and audited, but not the 
behavior itself ... According to the 2001 
Information Security Industry Survey, of all the 
security breaches perpetrated by the employees of 
the organization, 48% of them were accidental. 
This demonstrates that not all security breaches 
are maliciously intended, but may be the result 
of negligence or ignorance of the security 
policies of the organization. Of the remaining 
security breaches, 17% was intentionally 
committed, and of the other 35%, it was [sic] 
unsure whether it was malicious or not.” (Vroom 
and von Solms, 2004, p. 193)  
 
The authors suggested that by changing the culture of the 
organization, security could be enhanced. “A utopian 
information security culture would be where the employees 
of the organization follow the guidelines of the 
organization voluntarily as part of their second nature” 
(Vroom and von Solms, 2004, p. 195). 
Gal-Or & Ghose (2005) stated, “IT executives revealed 
that they were more concerned with the ripple effects of 
online security breaches on consumer confidence and trust 
in e-business than the actual financial losses of physical 
infrastructure” (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005, p. 197). 
Dinev and Qing (2007) reported that:  
computer viruses, spyware, cyber attacks, and 
computer system security breaches are daily 
occurrences. In the ten year period from 1993-
2003, the number of security incidents reported 
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to CERT increased from 1,334/year to 137,529/year. 
In order to effectively manage and control the 
ever-evolving and growing security threats, it is 
obviously not enough just to rely on deployment 
of security technologies such as anti-virus and 
intrusion detection software and hardware. (Dinev 
and Qing, 2007, p. 387) 
 
At the beginning of the recession of 2009, Hoffman 
(2009) interviewed security analysts about whether or not 
the recession would cause any changes to information 
security. All the analysts interviewed recommended to 
purchase security software. Brian Fuher, a program manager 
of SoftwareOne stated, “’[The reason to install antimalware] 
is the same reason we're probably buying insurance on our 
cars. The cost of damage is so great ... It's low-risk, 
high-reward. It's low-cost and such a great devastation if 
you get successfully attacked’”(Hoffman, 2009, p. 2). Sean 
Stenovitch, a partner with M&S Technologies, is quoted, 
“’In a down economy, desperation is going to create even 
more of a security risk.’" He concluded, "’[What] it really 
boils down to [is that] customers have to have security. 
They have to have protection’” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 1).  
Tittle (2005) introduced the concept of a Managed 
Security Services Provider (MSSP). These MSSPs are useful 
for small to medium size organizations that cannot employ 
an internal IT security team. An MSSP is an outsourced 
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security company that conducts both security evaluations 
(audits) as well as active monitoring for other 
organizations. “An MSSP is a third party that works with 
clients to assess and define security needs, evaluates any 
security policies, practices and procedures in place, and 
then implements and maintains a security infrastructure on 
its clients’ behalf” (Tittle, 2005, p. 20). 
Manning (2010) refers to using Software as a Service 
(SaaS) to help mitigate and outsource IS security. The 
article details how SaaS systems can integrate and fulfill 
government regulations. “Preservation of principal and 
value is another headline risk management concern for 
treasurers” (Manning (2010), p. 2). “Technology has 
provided a solution via bureau-based ‘soft-ware as a 
service’ (SaaS) options that allow companies to outsource 
their SWIFT messaging processing to a third-party for a 
service charge plus transaction costs, avoiding the need to 
manage the necessary infrastructure in-house” (Manning, 
2010, p. 1). 
The Institute of Management and Administration (IOMA) 
(2002) details fully automated security systems. The author 
predicts that by 2015 robot security guards will start to 
become economical compared to their human equivalents. This 
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futuristic technology is already one of the primary tools 
used by the military for combat surveillance. “While the 
U.S. military has for years used robot patrols to monitor 
warehouses and other indoor environments, they are 
investing significant resources to improve the technology 
so they can conduct outdoor patrols of airport grounds, 
military compounds, and fuel storage facilities” (IOMA, 
2002, p. 6). 
Herath and Herath (2009) stated that in 2007, 74% of 
organizations reporting attacks confirmed that the source 
of the attack was a virus or other malicious code. “Given 
the importance of computer and information security, 
investment in information security is now recognized as a 
critical issue by both practitioners and academics alike 
(Herath and Herath, 2009, p. 338).” “Information security 
projects have high-risk characteristics due to the changing 
threats to IT systems and the uncertainty associated with 
potential breaches” (Herath and Herath, 2009, p. 343). They 
concluded the following:  
If the first security investment is undertaken, 
the manager can undertake the second information 
security investment ... at any time between years 
1 and 3. If both the first and second information 
security investments are undertaken, the manager 
can invest in a third platform information 
security investment ... anytime between years 3 
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and 5. (Herath and Herath, 2009, p. 359) 
 
The Security Director's Report of IOMA in August of 
2009 summarized new data about technology-based security 
systems. The report found that, despite prevailing beliefs 
about these systems, technology alone does not prevent IS 
crime.  
In fact, property owners are so confident that 
these new, high-end systems will deter crime, few 
of them make an effort to validate the 
effectiveness of the systems they’ve implemented—
perhaps, because no one wants to find out they 
just spent a lot of money for nothing. (IOMA, 
2009, p. 1) 
  
“The fact that researchers could find no proof of the 
systems’ [sic] ability to cut crime should give security 
executives a moment’s pause” (IOMA, 2009, p. 13). They 
concluded, “We found no persuasive evidence that the 
introduction of CCTV [closed circuit television] and 
ancillary electronic monitoring equipment to [the subject 
complex] in Manhattan reduced the incidence of crime in 
[it]” (IOMA, 2009, p. 15). 
Though not prosecutable in criminal court, use of 
spyware is harmful, and attempts have been made to 
prosecute it in civil court. Oser (2004) discussed court 
proceedings against Claria Corp and WhenU.com. The article 
stated how the defendants produced spyware and provided ad 
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services across the internet. As of 2004, they were on the 
verge of having an initial public offering (IPO).  
Claria Corp. and WhenU.com, the two largest 
companies that produce the free, downloadable 
software called "ad ware," are increasing their 
profits year after year. Claria, the Redwood City, 
Calif., leader, which filed to go public in April, 
had $90.5 million in revenue in 2003 and is 
expected to enjoy a 30% expansion in revenue in 
2004. Claria's main competitor, WhenU, is 
profitable and on its way to $50 million in gross 
revenue in 2004, according to CEO Avi Naider. 
(Oser, 2004, para. 3) 
 
“Top advertisers across the pop-up space, as compiled by 
Nielsen/NetRatingsAdRelevance, range from bottom feeders 
such as LowerMyBills to blue-chip brands such as American 
Express” (Oser, 2004, para. 5). 
The Process of the Creation of Policy, Procedures, or 
Industry Standards and their Effects 
on Information Technology Security 
Organizations combat the aforementioned threats by 
creating security policies and procedures. The first 
procedures focused on the technology. As the threats 
changed, the policies and procedures shifted from 
technology-based to human-based solutions. Adams and Sasse 
(1999) first studied password schemes. The authors used a 
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web based questionnaire to study password systems. The 
questionnaire focused mainly on password related user 
behaviors (password construction, frequency of use, 
password recall, and work practices). They found that most 
users did not think that their job was high enough to 
warrant any effect on a breach of their account. They also 
found that users did not understand the authentication 
process, and that most confused the username with the 
password, thus trying to make their username as complex as 
their password and forcing further confusion. “Constantly 
changing passwords” were blamed by another employee for 
producing “...very simple choices that are easy to guess, 
or break, within seconds of using ‘Cracker’ Hence there is 
no security” (Adams and Sasse, 1999, p. 42). A cracker is a 
type of software program used to break passwords, either 
through brute force or by analytical attack. “Since 
security mechanisms are designed, implemented, applied, and 
breached by people, human factors should be considered in 
their design. It seems that currently, hackers pay more 
attention to the human link in the security chain than 
security designers do, for example, by using social 
engineering techniques to obtain passwords” (Adams and 
Sasse, 1999, p. 41)” 
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Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich (2001) did not want to 
lay the blame solely on users. They argued that users 
should not be blamed for being the “weakest link” in the 
information security process. They stated that environment 
and lack of training were larger issues that need to be 
addressed. “Security has largely ignored usability issues; 
many users of security systems face unattainable or 
conflicting demands, and receive no support or training” 
(Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich, 2001, p. 123). 
BT security staff believed that the rising number 
of password resets was due to a small number of 
careless ‘repeat offenders’ — by their own 
definition, employees who ask for a reset 6 or 
more times a month. Study 2 found that 91.7% of 
resets were caused by ‘normal users’, i.e. more 
than 90% of users cannot cope with the password 
mechanism in the way they were expected to, which 
is a rather damning result in terms of usability 
of password mechanisms. (Sasse, Brostoff, and 
Weirich, 2001, p. 125) 
 
“Consequently, security must be designed as an integral 
part of the system that supports a particular work activity 
in order to be effective and efficient” (Sasse, Brostoff, 
and Weirich, 2001, p. 128). 
Spears and Barki (2010) stated:  
It is widely believed that organizational efforts 
to manage IS security are typically focused on  
vulnerabilities in technological assets such as 
hardware, software, and networking, at the 
expense of managing other sources of 
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vulnerabilities, such as people, policies, 
processes, and culture. (Spears and Barki, 2010, 
p. 503) 
 
“Users are likely to be more attentive when IS security is 
something to which they can relate” (Spears and Barki, 2010, 
p. 518).  
Users can also allow themselves to become the gateway 
to security breaches. Bose and Leung (2007) found that five 
percent of people responded to phishing emails. A phish is 
when a hacker uses directed and customized message to 
entice a user to give private information. They stated: 
“Being a part of the global community, both corporations 
and individuals have certain social responsibilities to 
fight phishing” (Spears and Barki, 2010, p. 566). 
Gillespie (2009) reported that, while CIOs realize 
that security is one of the high agenda items on their 
lists, they do not fund security studies, reports, or 
audits. “They must attract key stakeholders to Buy-In to 
security from the off, in order that any corporate security 
policies generated are received from the whole company” 
(Gillespie, 2009, para. 9). “Security, information 
management, and information risk management should stop 
being seen as a costly add-on and in some cases a 'perk’.” 
“Instead, they need to be seen as fundamental core business 
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requirements.” (Gillespie, 2009, para. 3) 
Cremonini and Nizovtsev (2006) focused on analyzing 
the behavior of the attacker to gain an understanding of 
how to concentrate on network security. “Viewing attackers 
as rational agents is consistent with several theoretical 
and empirical studies” (Cremonini and Nizovtsev, 2006, p. 
1). “Any given security measure affects the frequency of 
intrusions through two mechanisms ... one is the increased 
ability of a target to withstand attacks of a given 
intensity. The other effect ... occurs through a change in 
attackers’ perception of the target in question” (Cremonini 
and Nizovtsev, 2006, p. 2). “The main purpose of investing 
in security is to defend against malicious attackers” 
(Cremonini and Nizovtsev, 2006, p. 4). “Our analysis 
suggests that the magnitude of the behavioral effect can 
greatly exceed that of the direct one” (Cremonini and 
Nizovtsev, 2006, pp. 21-22). 
Rees, Bandyopadhay, and Spafford (2003) proposed a 
framework for creating short-term security policies. They 
focused upon the fact that information technology changes 
rapidly and that security polices, when created, will 
outlive their useful life-cycle. Their model focuses upon 
constant feedback. After every ideation of the development 
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they consult their stakeholders for feedback. “Because 
policy development is an iterative process, the model 
includes feedback loops at every step” (Rees, Bandyopadhay, 
and Spafford, 2003, p. 102). They found that if one builds 
short-term policies “the security infrastructure” is more 
likely to be built on time and to meet requirements (Rees, 
Bandyopadhay, and Spafford, 2003, p. 102). This results in 
a Buy-In from their stakeholders as well as the ability to 
revisit the policy. “A security policy that is not 
constantly evaluated and updated is of no value” (Rees, 
Bandyopadhay, and Spafford, 2003, p. 105). 
GoodHue and Straub (1991) studied user behavior 
concerning security models. The authors identified four 
issues: 
1. as risk increases, users negative perceptions of 
security measures decrease; 
2. as more resources are used to increase security 
awareness perceptions of satisfaction with security 
increases; 
3. users who are more computer savvy will have lower 
levels of satisfaction with current security; and 
4. risk and company action is affected by user 
awareness. 
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 “Although I/S [sic] managers have at least marginal 
concerns about security, non I/S [sic] managers seem to be 
less concerned” (GoodHue and Straub, 1991, p. 118). They 
argued that “insufficient computer and data security is a 
major problem in many organizations, [sic] and that low 
levels of concern contribute to the danger” (GoodHue and 
Straub, 1991, p. 124). 
Weirch and Sasse (2002) interviewed users to find how 
they responded to security threats and password policies at 
their institutions. The authors found that most of the 
users did not have enough insight into security threats to 
use good judgment in challenging password policies. “Users 
cannot be forced to behave in a proper fashion, but an 
effort to persuade them to do so has to be made” (Weirch 
and Sasse, 2002, p. 143). “In addition, many users are not 
sufficiently educated about security issues. Thus, many 
users construct their own, often wildly inaccurate models 
of security threats and the importance and effective 
deployment of security measures” (Weirch and Sasse, 2002, p. 
137). 
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) took a unique view into 
the direct realm of the home user. They focused on home 
users because: “In late 2005, a watershed event occurred in 
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the worldwide penetration of information and communication 
technology: the number of computer users with Internet 
access crossed the one billion mark” (Anderson and Agarwal, 
2010, p. 614). They conducted a study of local internet 
service providers (ISP) users, and when they did not 
receive enough replies for a proper representation, added 
undergraduate students at a large university as a sample. 
They concluded that “the factors influencing home computer 
users’ attitude toward security-related behavior include 
concern about security threats, self-efficacy, and 
perceived citizen effectiveness that, in turn, influence 
security behavior. Security behavior is also influenced by 
psychological ownership and subjective and descriptive 
norms” (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010, p. 630). 
Workman, Bommer, and Straub (2008) conducted a study 
to gauge how much people thought about security threats and 
how well they coped with them. The authors found that when 
people had a higher perception of security threats, they 
took more precautions, and when they had a higher level of 
coping, they again took more threats seriously. “Coping 
depends on whether people feel that their ability to take 
security actions have been reasonable (self-efficacy), 
providing that they perceived that the threat is 
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preventable in the first place (locus of control)” (Workman, 
Bommer, and Straub, 2008, p. 2802). However, they found 
that “fear appeals can be counter-productive. When there 
are excessive false-positive alarms, people will tend to 
discount fear appeals” (Workman, Bommer, and Straub, 2008, 
p. 2812). 
Herath and Rao (2009) proposed a framework for 
security deterrence. They modeled this framework upon 
criminology general deterrence theory, theory of planned 
behavior, and procession motivation theory. The authors 
conducted a survey of 312 respondents representing 78 
organizations. The framework focused upon changing 
attitudes about security perceptions throughout the 
organization because “although organizations actively use 
security technologies and practices, information security 
cannot be achieved through technological tools alone” 
(Herath and Rao, 2009, p. 106). They found that “Most 
organizations spend time and resources to provide, 
establish, and monitor computer security policies; however, 
if the end-users of organizational IS are not keen or 
willing to follow the policies, then these efforts are in 
vain” (Herath and Rao, (2009, p. 118). “We, however, found 
that the certainty of security breaches does not have a 
36 
 
 
   
 
significant impact on the security concern ... More 
importantly, it is necessary for IT management to 
communicate the reality of security threats to 
organizational end-users” (Herath and Rao, 2009, p. 117). 
Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang (2008) used game 
theory from economics to explain hacker behavior and 
possible solutions. Game theory is the study of how people 
make strategic decisions. 
Economics as a tool for security analysis has 
gained in importance since the economy of 
attackers has become ... motivated by greed over 
the last years. This [is] in contrast to that 
exhibited by the hacker communities of the 1980s 
and 1990s, who valued reputation, intellectual 
achievement, and even entertainment above 
financial incentives. (Grossklags, Christin, and 
Chuang, 2008, p. 3) 
 
The authors identified two key components of a security 
strategy: “self- protection (e.g., patching system 
vulnerabilities) and self-insurance (e.g., having good 
backups)” (Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang, 2008, p. 4). 
The authors continued, “we model security as a hybrid 
between public and private goods” (Grossklags, Christin, 
and Chuang, 2008, p. 6). The computation of the protection 
level will often take the form of a public goods 
contribution function. Because network protection is a 
public good, it may allow, for certain types of 
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contribution functions, individuals to free-ride on others’ 
efforts. “Agents have two security actions at their 
disposal. They can contribute to a network-side protection 
pool or invest in a private good to limit losses” 
(Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang, 2008, p. 33). At the 
same time, some individuals may also suffer from inadequate 
protection efforts by other members if those have a 
decisive impact on the overall protection level. 
One of the most forceful industrial standards is that 
of the health care industry. Bresz (2004) discussed 
security frameworks in the context of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). The 
article explains how to implement new security training 
programs that are compliant with HIPAA. The four main 
points of HIPAA in regard to IS security are security 
reminders, protection from malicious software, log-in 
monitoring, and password management.  
If you do not plan to start a “reasonable and 
appropriate” security awareness and training 
program fairly soon, then your people will 
continue to be your weakest link in information 
security, and your organization may be at risk of 
not being in compliance with the HIPAA Security 
Rule as of April 21, 2005. (Bresz, 2004, p. 57) 
 
“While a technology can be used to guard against malicious 
software and can aid in the detection and reporting aspects, 
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it is ultimately a personal responsibility to be aware of 
software anomalies and to report them” (Bresz, 2004, p. 58). 
“Sound security needs to be something your organization’s 
personnel ‘live and breathe’ everyday. It must become an 
integral part of the company culture, with management 
sending the right message” (Bresz, 2004, p. 60). 
Another major industry pursuing information technology 
security standards is the payment card industry (PCI). 
According to Kim (2011), standards such as HIPAA and PCI 
are the primary motivation for organizations to adopt 
security innovations. PCI compliance has been in the 
forefront for security experts due to the fact that most 
businesses-to-customer transactions utilize either a debit 
or credit card. Vijayan (2008) interviewed Hannaford, a New 
England grocer, about their upgrading to a PCI-compliant 
network. He questioned whether or not it is enough just to 
have new systems, or if there are other factors. 
Despite the lack of more stringent requirements, 
encrypting card numbers on point-of-sale devices 
is "the most significant action" that retailers 
can take to stop attacks such as the one that hit 
Hannaford, said Gartner Inc. analyst Avivah Litan. 
But that doesn't necessarily mean that the new 
security measures will make Hannaford — or other 
companies that follow its lead — immune to future 
attacks. (Vijayan, 2008, p. 14) 
 
He concluded: “The unanswered question, though, is whether 
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that will put up a wall strong enough to keep future 
attackers out” (Vijayan, 2008, p. 14). 
Beckett (2005) discussed the concept of information 
security in the field of music. This was a new concept that 
producers faced. The producers found that they needed to 
secure their events for the masses that use the wireless 
spectrum to conduct the business of concerts.  
“Wireless networks are increasingly deployed at 
[concerts], as they are ideal for locations that 
lack existing infrastructure. But these too 
demand the highest levels of security," said 
Simons, a producer with Mean Fiddler. Because of 
the increasing threat, they disable all floppy 
and CD drives both for festival and permanent 
office use. All devices handed out to staff are 
anti-virused and pre-configured. "There's no 
chance of anyone being able to load any untoward 
software," Simons said. All devices are "ringed" 
and loaded with standard software. (Beckett, 2005, 
para. 15) 
 
Scholz (2009) discussed how even security 
professionals make the basic mistakes. The author focused 
on scope as one of the main problems that professionals 
face. “Information system boundaries can be confusing and 
are seldom identified fully” (Scholz, 2009, p. 35). He 
concluded, “No matter how you are structured, you must have 
management buy in or you have nothing!” (Scholz, 2009, p. 
33). 
Burke (2006) detailed shoppers’ concerns when 
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purchasing goods from a website. The author reviewed 
information gathered by Hewlett Packard (HP) about load 
times and Consumer Reports about privacy policies. He 
discussed third-party logos, such as Verified by Visa or 
Protected by McAfee, and how those logos increased consumer 
confidence in the websites on which they appeared. 
“Encouraging consumers to trust your Website involves 
committing time and resources to communicate the safety of 
your site, the professionalism of your operation, and the 
credibility of your brand” (Burke, 2006, p. 42). 
Yeh and Chang (2007) proposed a four-factor framework 
for creating measurable IS security. They surveyed 1000 
Taiwanese IT professionals across 4 major industries: 
general manufacturing, high-tech, banking, and retail. The 
results showed that across the board, IS networks had the 
greatest threat severity in all categories. “Often the 
benefits of security are not considered important until a 
security breach has occurred” (Yeh and Chang, 2007, p. 489). 
“This study also considered the scope of countermeasure 
adoption; it did not appear to be commensurate with the 
severity of the perceived IS threats” (Yeh and Chang, 2007, 
p. 482). They found that “security adoption tends to be a 
need-pull innovation rather than technology-push. As a 
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result, organizations probably only adopt new 
countermeasures when their security methods appear insecure” 
(Yeh and Chang, 2007, p. 490). Their conclusion stated, 
“[Service based industries] should emphasize their security 
policy development and allocate security accountability” 
(Yeh and Chang, 2007, p. 491). 
Von Solms and von Solms’ paper (2004) discussed the 
“10 sins of information security.” These sins were created 
from the authors’ perspective as security officers for the 
central bank of South Africa. The sins were simply 
presented and not researched. They were: 
1. not realizing that information security is a 
corporate governance responsibility (the buck stops 
right at the top); 
2. not realizing that information security is a 
business issue and not a technical one; 
3. not realizing the fact that information security 
governance is a multi-dimensional discipline 
(information security governance is a complex issue, 
and there is no silver bullet or single “off the 
shelf” solution); 
4. not realizing that an information security plan 
must be based on identified risks; 
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5. not realizing (and leveraging) the important role 
of international best practices for information 
security management; 
6. not realizing that a corporate information security 
policy is absolutely essential; 
7. not realizing that information security compliance, 
enforcement, and monitoring are absolutely 
essential; 
8. not realizing that a proper information security 
governance structure (organization) is absolutely 
essential; 
9. not realizing the core importance of information 
security awareness amongst users; and 
10. not empowering information security managers with 
the infrastructure, tools, and supporting 
mechanisms to properly perform their 
responsibilities. 
Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) proposed a framework for 
information security governance. They focused their 
framework on developing a security culture. “To inculcate 
an acceptable level of information security culture, the 
organization must govern information security effectively 
by implementing all the required information security 
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components.” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007, p. 361)  
As time went by, the “technical people” in 
organizations started to realize that management 
played a significant role in information security 
and that top management needed to become involved 
in it too (Von Solms, 2000). This led to a second 
phase, where information security was 
incorporated into organizational structures. (Da 
Veiga and Eloff, 2007, p. 362) 
  
They also stated, “Security policies, procedures, standards, 
and guidelines are key to the implementation of information 
security in order to provide management with direction and 
support (ISO 17799, 2005) and they should clearly state 
what is expected of employees” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007, p. 
369). 
Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2004) analyzed 
end-user behavior. They surveyed 1,167 people in the U.S. 
about their use of passwords and how they responded to 
password policies. “Appropriate and constructive behavior 
by end users, system administrators, and others can enhance 
the effectiveness of information security while 
inappropriate and destructive behaviors can substantially 
inhibit its effectiveness” (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and 
Jolton, 2004, p. 2). “First, our survey suggested that end 
users have a rather dismal record of enacting the basic 
hygiene behaviors that security experts suggest are 
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important in maintaining the safety of user accounts (e.g., 
frequent changes to one’s password)” (Stanton, Stam, 
Mastrangelo, and Jolton, 2004, p. 8). “Through careful 
analysis of end user security-related behaviors, 
organizations can help to ensure that workers have the 
motivation and knowledge to follow the policies that the 
organization sets to promote its security agenda” (Stanton, 
Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton, 2004, p. 9). 
Furnell, Dowland, Illingworth, and Reynolds (2000) 
surveyed users about authentication behavior. They 
discussed a lack of user understanding of authentication 
and stated that authentication was easily compromised. They 
discussed a replacement of authentication systems: “If the 
password approach is to be replaced or supplemented, then 
alternative means of authentication are clearly required. 
However, when considering such alternatives, a number of 
factors can be cited that may complicate their adoption: 
•Effectiveness (i.e. the ability to detect impostors, 
whilst allowing legitimate access). 
•Cost (i.e. financial overheads of deployment). 
•User acceptance (i.e. the friendliness and 
transparency of the measure).” (Furnell, Dowland, 
Illingworth, and Reynolds, 2000, p. 529)  
45 
 
 
   
 
They concluded that “overall, a significant factor in the 
acceptance of alternatives to the password will be that of 
education. If people can be shown that newer authentication 
techniques are safe, reliable and secure, then their 
acceptance is likely to be improved” (Furnell, Dowland, 
Illingworth, and Reynolds, 2000, p. 538). 
Charndra and Calderor (2005) proposed using biometrics 
as an enhanced security measure to positively identify 
users in high security areas. They predicted that 
biometrics will become more standardized as time goes on. 
The authors proposed six categories that stand in the way 
of full implementation: Technical, Legal, People (Trust and 
confidence), Business (Cost and control), Operation (Lab vs. 
real world), and Systems (integration with existing 
security measures). “The very connectivity that enhances 
global business increases vulnerability and exposure 
associated with attacks on computer systems” (Charndra and 
Calderor, 2005, p. 102). “Protection of information 
resources must involve a process that unambiguously 
identifies and authenticates users” (Charndra and Calderor, 
2005, p. 102). 
Cryptography is one method of ensuring that network 
communication stays private. Stix (2005) said, “The 
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challenge modern cryptographers face is for sender and 
receiver to share a key while ensuring that no one has 
filched a copy” (Stix, 2005, p. 1). Based on his study, 
network managers face a difficult task in ensuring that the 
appropriate key is sent to the correct people without 
publishing it across the Internet. “The current uses for 
quantum cryptography are in networks of limited geographic 
reach” (Stix, 2005, p. 3). 
Backhouse, Hsu, and Silva (2006) showed how power is 
part of the standardization process. They studied the work 
of Stewart Clegg, who related power to a circuit. "The 
episodic circuit emphasized actions and changes in the 
organizational context. It manifests when an A makes a B do 
something the latter would otherwise not do” (Backhouse, 
Hsu, and Silva, 2006, p. 415). Just as electricity flows 
through an electrical grid, power also flows between social 
relations, working practices, and techniques of discipline. 
Changes in power come from external forces like 
regulations, mimetic forces, or changes in industry. These 
changes in power cause people to go through obligatory 
passage points (OPPs). OPPs are exactly what A wants B to 
do (e.g., if B wants access to a document, A requires him 
to use a username and password). The authors used a case 
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study to conduct their research. They studied a British 
company transitioning from the standard BS7799 to ISO 17799. 
The term of the study was September 2003 to March 2004. The 
primary source of data was from interviews via telephone, 
via email, and in person, in that order. The interviews 
used validation criteria defined by Klein and Myers (1999). 
The authors’ findings suggested that the standard became an 
OPP when business B required A to adhere to the standard 
when dealing with business B. This again shows the external 
forces required when an OPP is in place. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development's (OECD's) Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems and Networks suggested four tasks that 
management needed to perform: 1) state the policy, 2) 
direct action plans, 3) review results, and 4) take 
corrective action. 
They further outlined nine principles that provide a 
comprehensive framework for information security: 1) 
awareness, 2) responsibility, 3) response, 4) ethics, 5) 
democracy, 6) risk assessment, 7) security design and 
implementation, 8) security management, and 9) reassessment. 
1. Awareness: Participants should be aware of the need 
for security of information systems and networks 
48 
 
 
   
 
and of what they can do to enhance security 
2. Responsibility: Everybody is responsible for 
security 
3. Response: Everybody should act quickly and 
courteously to prevent, detect, and respond to 
security incidents 
4. Ethics: Everybody should respect the legitimate 
interests of others 
5. Democracy: The security of information systems 
should be compatible with the values of a 
democratic society 
6. Risk assessment: Each aspect of operations is 
reviewed. 
7. Security Design and Implementation: Follow the 
system development life cycle (SDLC) established by 
the company 
8. Security management: Ensure that proper people are 
employed to follow both extremely scripted actions 
as well as outside-the-box thinking 
9. Reassessment: Always follow up with auditing. (OECD, 
2002, Section III, para. 2) 
Cavusoglu and Raghunathan (2004) proposed that 
traditional decision theory-based approaches to security 
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create a dichotomy to the false-positive or false-negative 
rate of security systems (as one decreases, the other 
increases). They proposed using game theory as the basis of 
designing a security system due to the fact that outside 
threats use human intervention and not just an uncertain 
response.  
Although the decision theory–based approach can 
provide a useful starting point for managing risk 
in settings where potential for fraud exists, we 
argue in this paper that this method is 
incomplete because of the problem’s strategic 
nature ... Hackers do not randomly select their 
targets. They rationally make their choices based 
on how much effort will be required to succeed in 
hacking, the probability of getting caught, and 
the possible penalty. (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan, 
2004, p. 132) 
 
Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, and Yue (2008) also used Game 
Theory to predict investment in IT security. They found 
that using game theory had a higher payoff than using 
decision theory approaches except when hacker activity 
levels were precisely estimated.  
The reason for the limitation of traditional 
models, when applied to analyze IT security 
problems, can be stated as one simple proposition: 
They do not allow a firm’s security investment to 
influence the behavior of hackers. On the 
contrary, behavioral influences of security 
technology on hackers have long been recognized 
by researchers and practitioners in the security 
community. (Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, and Yue, 2008, 
p. 283) 
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Straub and Welke (1998) discussed risk, specifically 
loss based upon systems risk. This risk can be managed when 
managers are keenly aware of the full range of risk and the 
most effective controls to that risk. “The key to [managing 
risk is] successfully deterring, preventing, and detecting 
abuse as well as pursuing remedies and/or punishing 
offenders for abuse” (Straub and Welke, 1998, p. 445). 
Davis (1989) proposed the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM). TAM dealt with how users responded to new technology. 
Davis found that users adapted new technology if it was 
easy (ease-of-use) and useful (help in their jobs). 
Fang, Chan, Brzezinski, and Xu (2006) used the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) to explain wireless 
technology acceptance. They categorized the tasks performed 
on wireless handheld devices into three categories: (1) 
general tasks that do not involve transactions and gaming, 
(2) gaming tasks, and (3) transactional tasks. They found 
that use of wireless handheld devices was increasing in all 
of these categories. Especially as these devices were used 
for electronic commerce, personal and financial information 
became more vulnerable. One of their conclusions was that 
“The future of electronic commerce depends on controlling 
information security threats, enhancing consumer security 
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perceptions, and building trust” (Fang, Chan, Brzezinski, 
and Xu, 2006, p. 129). 
Rotchanakitumnuai and Speece (2009) used TAM in the 
context of internet securities trading. They examined the 
antecedents of perceived usefulness and explored the role 
of trust and attitude of securities investors toward usage. 
The behavioral intention of investors to use the internet 
securities trading service was influenced by perceived 
usefulness, attitude toward usage, and trust. “In addition, 
trust is important at all levels of the TAM” 
(Rotchanakitumnuai and Speece, 2009, p. 1069). 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL 
Establishment 
The Chain-Link Fence Model of security procedure 
creation was derived from the need to establish a 
streamlined method of creating security procedures at Utah 
State University. Based on a review of current literature, 
some studies discussed a need for more security. Other 
papers proposed better security through various methods, 
such as increasing user trust of IT professionals, 
proposing specific technologies, and creating management 
Buy-In. None of the studies detailed how an organization 
should go about creating security procedures. The 
contribution of this study to the general IS knowledge base 
will be the development, validation, and analysis of the 
Chain-Link Fence Model for the creation of Information 
System Security Procedures. According to the preliminary 
research conducted, no other comprehensive framework was 
found to guide the development of the procedures in a large 
organizational setting. 
The goals of the Chain-Link Fence Model are: 
1. to provide a model from which anyone can create 
procedures that have the best possible chance of 
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accomplishing the security goals of the 
organization; 
2. to identify how to create procedures that are in 
harmony with the goals of the organization; 
3. to assist in creation of procedures that can be 
understood by all levels of the organization; and 
4. to outline a method for efficiently creating 
procedures without the need to convene a group of 
representatives from the organization. 
From these points the interdependent components of the 
Chain-Link Fence Model: Buy-In, Implementation, Ease-of-use, 
and Effectiveness, were derived (see Figure 1). 
Each of these components addresses issues that were 
highlighted in notes from the task force meetings or found 
in previous research.  
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Figure 1. The Chain-Link Fence Model. 
Buy-In is the process of selling the new policy or 
procedure to all users of the organization. Management 
needs to buy-in to the procedure so that it will be 
implemented. Users need to buy-in to the procedure because 
they will be the people who choose whether or not to follow 
it on a daily basis. Without this user Buy-In, they will 
find ways to circumvent the procedure without raising 
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suspicion. This affects both the Effectiveness and Ease-of-
Use domains.   
Implementation is the process by which computer 
managers configure software, use security tools, or teach 
their users how to follow the new procedure. The success of 
Implementation is directly related to Ease-of-Use. A 
procedure that has the support of the management and users 
will still fail if the proper steps are not taken to 
implement it.  
Ease-of-Use mitigates costs associated with training 
and lack of compliance with new procedures. It also lessens 
the need for an in-depth knowledge of security tools. Users 
who are burdened by the new procedures may rebel against 
them. If the new procedure is easy to follow, users are 
more likely to use it. If Ease-of-Use is not included in 
procedure, both Buy-In and Implementation are ineffective.  
Effectiveness is an assessment of how the security 
procedure reduces the threat it addresses. Effectiveness is 
the hardest component to predict because it can only be 
measured after the procedure is implemented. If the 
procedures do not change the threat impact, then there was 
no point gained in creating procedures in the first place, 
thereby wasting time, effort, and resources. These points 
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are the basis for the Chain-Link Fence Model 
 
The Chain-Link Fence Model 
Graphically, each component of the Chain-Link Fence 
Model links to create a fence of security for the 
organization. If one of the components is missing, the 
fence will have a gap through which security threats can 
enter the organization.  
The components of the Chain-Link Fence Model usually 
operate in sequence:  Buy-in must be created to entice 
stakeholders to invest time, effort, and resources in 
developing procedures. Next, the procedure is introduced to 
all the necessary users, thus implementing the procedures. 
Computer managers generally handle the software 
configuration and training included in Implementation. 
After Implementation, Ease-of-Use is a major factor in 
whether or not the procedure will be followed by the users. 
Lastly, Effectiveness is measured by an audit system. 
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RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Timeline of Events in the Research 
The task force for creating computer security 
management at Utah State University was created in August 
2009 (see Appendix A). One of the first processes that the 
task force set out to accomplish was to define the scope 
for new computer management procedures. It was decided that 
the scope should be narrow to help focus the task force to 
complete the procedures without having to become experts in 
every future technology issue. Because of the narrow scope, 
the author realized that newer and broader security 
procedures would need to be created to help manage security 
threats as technology changed. This realization implied 
that the entire process would be repeated as security 
threats changed. By creating a process for creating 
security procedures, future resources may be saved.  
One of the tasks the task force assigned to its 
members was to find out how peer institutions responded to 
security threats and if they had any procedures that could 
be implemented at USU. Most institutions’ security 
procedures were too narrow to use or were nonexistent. This 
led to a study of industry standards and academic research 
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into both procedures as well as the processes for creation 
of security procedures. This research helped form the 
components and structure of the Chain-Link Fence Model. 
The Chain-Link Fence Model was created as a framework 
to help standardize the process of creating security 
procedures. As co-chair of the task force, the author used 
the Chain-Link Fence Model to create the computer 
management procedures. The Network Managers Group, a group 
composed of computer professionals from the colleges, 
departments, and labs at USU, approved the computer 
management procedures in February of 2010. 
The interviews as outlined in the study design were 
conducted in two groups. Subjects A, B, and C were 
interviewed in April 2010 with follow up interviews in 
February 2011. Data collection from the Nessus results 
started in September 2009 and continued until the end of 
May 2010. Subjects D, E, F, and G were asked to use the 
Chain-Link Fence Model framework to create security 
policies in July of 2011, and final interviews were in late 
September and early October 2011.  
Study Design 
The first portion of the research was model 
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development. The model was developed based upon theory, 
observation, and expert insight. After the creation of the 
model, seven subjects were interviewed, and these 
interviews were divided into two main parts. The primary 
methodology of the interview portion was the case study 
model. In Part One, the Validation of the components of the 
Chain-Link Fence Model, the first case study gathered data 
through interviews, observation notes, and statistical 
reports to validate the components of the Chain-Link Fence 
Model by analyzing the adoption of new security procedures 
at Utah State University. In Part Two, the Validation of 
the Chain-Link Fence Model, four computer lab managers 
tested the Chain-Link Fence Model by using it to create new 
procedures for their labs. The resulting data was gathered 
through further interviews. For both main parts, the 
subjects were given the opportunity to review the 
transcription of the interview and to clarify any comments. 
The case study technique provided in-depth study of a 
single event, in the case of Part One, the adoption of new 
security procedures at Utah State University. A case study 
also allowed for the testing of the model proposed as 
outlined in Part Two with the four additional subjects. 
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Details of the Study 
This paper is divided into two parts. Part One refines 
and establishes the validity of the Chain-Link Fence Model; 
Part Two tests its actual implementation.  
Part One: the validation process for each component of the 
Chain-Link Fence Model: 
This is an assessment of the Chain-Link Fence Model 
using interviews with upper IT management personnel 
regarding the success of the new security procedures at USU. 
Their responses validated each of the four components of 
the Chain-Link Fence Model.  
Additionally, a statistical analysis of computer 
security data from before and after the implementation of 
the new security procedures was conducted. Because the new 
procedures contained the components of the Chain-Link Fence 
Model, the statistical data was used to determine 
correlation between the Chain-Link Fence Model and IT 
security threats.  
Part Two: The study of the model from start to finish: 
Four computer lab managers at USU were presented with 
the Chain-Link Fence Model along with an explanation of its 
components. They were then asked to use the model to create 
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security procedures for their labs. After they implemented 
the procedures, follow-up interviews gauged their perceived 
results.  
The Process of Interviewing the Subjects 
In order to refine and validate the Chain-Link Fence 
Model, information technology professionals were 
interviewed. The interviews were held over the course of 
two years and were divided into two groups. The first, 
presented as Part One, consisted of three information 
technology professionals from the university information 
technology department. The other four subjects, as 
presented in Part Two, were lab managers from different 
colleges or departments from across the university. These 
seven subjects came from all levels of the organization 
from the CIO to small lab managers. The subjects had all 
been in the information technology field for more than 
seven years, were currently managers of either departments 
or computer labs, and had been with the organization for 
more than five years. 
Criteria for Selection of Case Study Subjects 
The primary criteria for selection of subjects was 
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that they did not participate in the task force. This was 
necessary to help validate the Buy-In category, as members 
of the task force would have a bias toward accepting the 
computer management procedures.  
Second, the subjects needed to be managers of 
departments or computer labs. This insured that they had 
perspective on the Implementation component. They would 
need to either teach their subordinates how to implement 
the new procedures or do it themselves. This consistency of 
implementation was extremely important in the computer lab 
environment because each lab would have dozens, potentially 
hundreds, of users on a given system. 
Third, subjects needed to have experience in computer 
management. This gave them insight into Ease-of-Use. By 
having years of experience, they knew what users needed and 
how users interacted with the computer system. They were 
able to evaluate the difficulties of different procedures, 
including their own. 
Fourth, the subjects needed to be actively involved in 
computer management. In order to see if a procedure was 
effective, they needed to have access to log files, audit 
reports, and Nessus penetration results. They then needed 
to interpret the reports to see if security procedures were 
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having any effect on their labs. 
All seven subjects were specifically selected for each 
of the above categories and agreed to participate in the 
study without any expectation of gain. Each also agreed to 
participate in multiple interviews over a 2-year span. Each 
subject was recommended by another member of the 
university’s Network Managers group for their handling of 
computer management. Together, the subjects managed or were 
part of the group that managed over 90% of the computer 
labs across the campus. Each subject was given a letter 
designation (A through G) to ensure anonymity. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL 
History 
As co-chair the task force beginning August 2009, the 
author determined that there must be a framework for 
achieving the goal of developing IT security procedures on 
the USU campus. After researching many different 
institutions for their security procedures and finding that 
most did not have any formal written procedures available, 
the research literature guided the development of this 
model. 
The available literature showed no single standard for 
creating security policy or procedures. There were helpful 
guidelines provided by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) that contained references to computer 
security, the International Information Systems Security 
Certification Consortium, Inc., (ISC)² maintained a global 
standard for information technology security professionals, 
and Microsoft offered a class on how to properly configure 
Windows in various environments. 
These resources, however, did not contain any method 
of a higher level framework to create security procedures. 
They had either very specific guidelines for a subset of 
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requirements (e.g., Microsoft’s configuration for small 
business and (ISC)² model for penetration testing), or in 
contrast, they were overly broad (like NIST’s statement of 
security management and assurance). In part, NIST stated, 
“Ultimately, responsibility for the success of an 
organization lies with its senior management. They 
establish the organization's computer security program and 
its overall program goals” (NIST, 2012). The author then 
started searching the academic research topics for 
guidelines, frameworks, procedures, and other keywords to 
help develop a framework so that the efforts of the task 
force could be replicated quicker and easier. 
The Creation of the Procedures 
The university employed many individuals who had 
information technology responsibilities. All had varying 
degrees of knowledge of information technology. The task 
force realized early on that this potential knowledge base 
needed to be used to help guide the formation of the 
computer management procedures. The task force decided to 
create a survey to help identify and prioritize the 
procedures. 
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The task force created a survey in September 2009 to 
determine how different departments handled computer setup, 
maintenance, and replacement. It was hosted on 
surveymonkey.com and given by invitation to all IT 
professionals at the university. This survey was conducted 
through November 15, 2009 and had 44 respondents. The 
survey contained a list of security tasks. Each respondent 
was required to categorize each task by required, 
suggested, or optional. The raw data was then coded by a 
scoring system of five points for required, three points 
for suggested, and one point for optional. Each task was 
then averaged for the total mean score of that procedure. 
Tasks that scored above four points were initially placed 
in Tier 1 (Required). Tasks that scored between three 
points and four points were initially placed in Tier 2 
(Suggested), and, tasks that scored below three points were 
initially placed in Tier 3 (Optional) (see Table 1). 
These tasks constituted the computer management 
procedures for Windows, standard security. Results for 
other systems can be seen in Appendix B. 
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Table 1 
Task Force Survey Results 
 
Tier 1  (REQUIRED) 
Rating 
Average 
Install/configure anti-virus software 4.95 
Configure automatic Windows updates 4.80 
Register IP address in OpenIPAM 4.55 
Install/configure firewall software 4.37 
Update drivers 4.27 
Disable the local Windows Guest account 4.12 
Disable auto-run 3.39 
Tier 2 (SUGGESTED)  
Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration) 3.94 
Convert file system to NTFS 3.91 
Uninstall "bloatware" 3.79 
Install/configure anti-malware software 3.79 
Install/configure SCCM 3.29 
Reformat hard drive and install Windows from scratch 3.11 
Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account 3.05 
Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater) 3.05 
Disable all unnecessary services (e.g., utilize Windows Baseline Security Analyzer) 2.94 
Rename local Administrator account 2.52 
Disable Administrator account 1.85 
Tier 3 (OPTIONAL)  
Employ a backup solution (e.g., shadow copy, store-to-network, portable external drive) 2.94 
Configure services to use non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop) 2.88 
Employ security-related group policies via Active Directory (i.e., join Windows domain) 2.82 
Install/disallow certain web browsers 2.82 
Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in) 2.69 
Configure power management options 2.68 
Employ security-related local group policies 2.60 
Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia Personal Software Inspector) 2.52 
Install Windows from an actively maintained image (e.g., Ghost) 2.50 
Install Windows from scratch with slipstreamed service packs and/or patches 2.41 
Rename the local Windows Guest account 2.41 
Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account 2.40 
Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history 2.20 
Encrypt the hard drive 1.33 
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After compiling the results from the survey, the task 
force used them with subsequent internal discussion to 
create the finalized version of the computer management 
procedures. After conducting the survey, the university was 
given an outside security audit that found some of the 
procedures should be categorized higher to prevent a 
greater threat than others. The task force took into 
account these recommendations and created the final version 
of the computer management procedures. 
The notes from the task force meetings show the 
following observations: 
1. Each person on the task force was more concerned 
about his own departmental needs than the security 
needs of the organization as a whole. One member 
did not want any other members of the university IT 
community to have any type of access on his system. 
As a result, the person did not want to join any 
centralized administrative process, specifically 
the university’s global Windows domain. 
2. The members of the task force did not all have an 
awareness of, or experience using, the security 
tools that the organization had at its disposal. 
One member did not know any of the benefits of 
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using organizational units (OU) within Windows 
Group Policy. Once this concept was explained, he 
realized that he could accomplish more security 
goals with less effort when he was working as part 
of the group. 
3. Each person in the task force wanted the 
organization to have a more secure network and was 
willing to help produce that result. One member 
postponed his vacation for six months to be able to 
provide his input. 
4. There was a need for the task force to establish 
the scope of the procedures, specifically what 
devices and software would be included or excluded. 
The procedures that were created only covered 
Macintosh and Windows-based PCs. While the procedures were 
a guideline on how students should set up their computers, 
the procedures fell under the University employee policy, 
and there was no requirement that students use the 
procedures. 
The Need for a Framework 
Information Technology is an ever-evolving field, and 
the process of creating procedures needed to be repeated 
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time and time again to address new devices and technologies 
that arise. As USU grew, the largest growth area in the 
network was wireless connections. As the internet had 
increasingly become people’s main source of media, the 
number of devices that took advantage of this new method of 
distribution grown. New devices, including the Apple iPad, 
Motorola Droid, and Google Chromebooks, made it harder to 
define what an IT device was. Most people would agree that 
anything computer-related would come under the IT umbrella, 
like laptops, desktops, networking devices, etc. However, 
devices like game consoles, blue-ray players, and 
televisions had wireless internet connectivity built-in.  
As more of these devices joined the network, new 
procedures were needed to define secure methods of using 
these devices. It took eight people six months of weekly 
meetings to create the current procedures in this study. 
Institutions cannot afford to dedicate numerous resources 
every time they need a new security procedure. If there was 
a model to follow for creating security procedures, then 
anyone who saw a security need could use it and quickly get 
procedures implemented. Using this experience on the task 
force as a guide, the author developed the Chain-Link Fence 
Model for the creation of security procedures.  
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Formulation of the Components 
A major paper influencing the author’s development of 
the Chain-Link Fence Model was by Da Veiga and Eloff (2007). 
Their paper had a framework for IS governance, rather than 
security directly. Their framework suggested changes to the 
organization’s security culture. It discussed the need for 
management buy-in to change the culture. 
Buy-in 
Backhouse et al. (2006) addressed power. Without full 
buy-in from those in power, the process could not be 
completed. This and the Da Veiga and Elorff (2007) article 
showed how the process starts with buy-in. In their study 
of spyware Warkentin, Xin, and Templeton (2005) found that 
understanding the problem, or buy-in, would help in the use 
of anti-spyware software. Gillespie (2009) stated that buy-
in was necessary for enhanced security. 
Ease-of-Use 
An influence of the Ease-of-Use component is a 
standard of IS research in the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM) by Davis (1989). His research into TAM suggested that 
ease-of-use helped users develop the necessary skills to 
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adopt new technology. In the current study, the author 
predicted that with new security procedures, there would be 
new-to-users technology that they would need to accept. 
Mustonen-Ollila and Lyytien’s study of IS history (2003) 
also showed that one of the most influential factors in 
progressing IS process was ease-of-use. In 2009, Scholz 
discussed basic mistakes that were caused by overly 
confusing the security process. This confusion suggested 
that ease-of-use must be part of the process in order to 
prevent human error. 
Implementation 
At this point, the model’s framework showed a logic 
gap. To go from organizational buy-in to ease-of-use, users 
needed the actual procedures to be written with full 
documentation. Bresz (2004) researched how hospital 
information technology dealt with Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). One of the key 
parts of HIPAA was full documentation before changes could 
be made to a system (i.e., a procedure for implementation).  
Von Solms and von Solms’s (2004) article of the 10 
sins of IS security suggested that training both the 
culture and users were very important to maintaining proper 
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security. Vroom and von Sols (2004) stated that up to 48 
percent of breaches were accidental in nature. This showed 
that proper implementation of procedures could greatly 
reduce security issues. This led to the inclusion of 
implementation as a component of the Chain-Link Fence Model. 
Sasse et al. (2001) showed that users needed training to 
avoid being the weakest link in the security process. 
Effectiveness 
The buy-in component was necessary for development, 
and the ease-of-use component was necessary for users to 
change the overall culture of security. Rees et al. (2003) 
created short-term security policies. The usefulness of 
these policies was determined by feedback from stakeholders. 
This led to the inclusion of evaluation as part of the 
Chain-Link Fence Model framework. Vroom and von Solms (2004) 
showed how auditing was an effective tool for gauging how 
an organization complied with their security policies. 
Furnell et al. (2000) specifically discussed how 
effectiveness could also lead to adoption of security 
measures, showing how the starting point of a future model 
could be at the end of a process. 
As the components were identified, the model of the 
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framework needed to be expounded upon. The first diagram 
for the model of the framework was a straight line (see 
Figure 2). 
The straight line, however, implied that once the 
process was complete, the goal was achieved. As the Rees et 
al. (2003) article stated, there needed to be a constant 
feedback part to the model, in essence closing the loop. 
 
Figure 2. Developmental Step 1 of Chain-Link Fence Model. 
This led to a different model demonstrating an ever-
completing cycle required by constant feedback (see Figure 
3). 
Buy-in Implementation Ease-of-use Effectiveness
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Figure 3. Developmental Step 2 of Chain-Link Fence Model.  
Further thought led to the realization that each 
component was not a stand-alone component. They needed 
interaction to build upon each other. Also, while the cycle 
did start with Buy-in, the linear model could only run 
forward in sequence. 
This led to back the final completed framework and the 
name for the Chain-Link Fence Model. 
  
Buy-in
Implementation
Ease-of-use
Effectiveness
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VALIDATION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL   
PART 1: DEEP INTERVIEW AND EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE 
Introduction 
The need to replicate the process of creating security 
procedures drove the need to create a repeatable model. In 
order to ascertain whether or not the proposed model worked, 
experts needed to validate the proposed model. This created 
a need to interview experts in information technology 
security. 
The Interview Process 
The questions for the interviews were composed based 
upon a review of the literature in the field. The questions 
were also written specifically to avoid using the names of 
the components of the Chain-Link Fence Model in order to 
draw out responses that would not have bias toward 
expounding the model. Finally, while the same questions 
were asked of all subjects, the questions were open-ended, 
and each subject was free to elaborate on topics important 
to him regarding computer security. These digressions also 
helped provide data that reflected on the overall model. 
Each interview was scheduled before a significant 
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break, either lunch, mid-day, afternoon, or before end-of-
business to allow for as limitless a time period as 
possible. Each interview was held at the subject’s primary 
work environment. In addition to placing the subjects in an 
area with which they were familiar and in which they were 
accustomed to thinking about security matters, this had the 
added benefit of placing them near their work resources so 
that they were able to answer questions on the spot, 
without having to research the question and report back 
later. 
Each interview was recorded on analog tape, forcing a 
human interpretation of the transcriptions. After 
transcripts of the interviews were made, each subject was 
allowed to look at the transcript of his interview to judge 
whether the transcript was accurate. Because there were no 
digital copies of the recordings, it was much easier to 
prevent duplication and to help keep the interview subject 
anonymous. 
Questions asked of the first subjects interviewed were 
asked of subsequent subjects as deemed relevant. Questions 
which were confusing in early interviews were clarified for 
later subjects. The full list of interview questions can be 
found in Appendix C. 
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Reception of the Security Procedures 
Everyone at the organization knew that the status quo 
was not a good security plan. At the January 2010 meeting 
outlining the new procedures, the Network Managers Group 
discussed the ramifications of establishing organizational 
procedures. Notes from the meeting included the following 
exchange: 
 Attendee 1: Does this apply to everybody? 
 Bob: Everybody connected to the network. 
 Attendee 2: What happens if we don't follow [the 
procedures]? 
 Bob: You risk having your computer compromised by a 
hacker, and if you develop a problem, you could find 
yourself on the disabled list. 
At the meeting there were a few who felt that the 
procedures were draconian, but after the group went over 
the specifics of the procedures, it was established that 
the procedures consisted of activities that most were 
already doing. 
The procedures were adopted at the following meeting 
February 9, 2010. They were ratified by the entire Network 
Managers Group at the monthly meeting. After allowances for 
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questions and an in-depth discussion of the procedures, the 
vote to establish them was unanimous. 
Buy-in 
Interview subjects were asked about their thoughts on 
the procedures to establish the presence of Buy-In. All 
subjects thought highly of the newly-adopted computer 
management procedures.  
Subject A, the CIO, had long wanted to build a 
procedure that could be used to get everybody “on the same 
page.”  He recognized that consensus, or Buy-In, was key to 
an effective security procedure. He stated, “The first 
strength is [that] it’s ... documented and it’s achieving 
consensus.” When discussing the security implications, he 
said, “In regards to security, it’s certainly better than 
anything we had. One of the goals of this above beyond 
anything was to get ... some consensus.” He continued, “The 
ability to come to consensus [and have the] Network 
Managers group say that this [is a] thing we should be 
doing [is key]. The compliance of the individual items 
[exceeded] my expectations. I wasn’t entirely sure if we 
could come to any consensus on this, but that happened. And 
that, for me, overshadows any weaknesses.” 
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Subject B also seemed to have a strong opinion of the 
importance of Buy-In. He said, “I think it was a big 
task ... to bring consensus from a large group of people 
across campus, and so I think it was [a] great effort.” 
When asked what he thought was one of the most important 
points of the recommendation, he immediately responded, 
“Buy-In from the community, because I felt that that was 
the only way to do it.” 
Subject B: Central IT couldn’t come up with those ... 
we aren’t our service desk guys working with desktops 
on a day-to-day basis ... The only way we could get 
what’s going on out there was to get people who were 
doing this on a day-to-day basis. And that had to go 
way beyond IT. So Buy-In was part of it, and the other 
part was to get a broad picture of input. 
Subject B provided important insight, as he was involved in 
approving the procedures. 
Subject B: We have some folks, who can sometimes be 
critical ... They always wanted to challenge something, 
and I hoped they would take the opportunity to get 
aboard. 
In regard to the process, Subject B thought that using 
the task force to create the procedures was one of the 
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contributing factors to Buy-In. He stated, “The committee 
that made it happen, just made it happen, and there we got 
an excellent product, excellent product ... I couldn’t 
[have] been happier.”  When asked what specifically made 
the committee work so well, he said, “what was cool [was 
that] we had folks representing several of our largest 
colleges: [the] College of Business, [the] College of HASS, 
which is our largest college on campus, [the] College of 
Agriculture which is big, [and] Person X [with the] College 
of Education. So we had four of the [eight] major colleges 
represented.” 
At the conclusion of the interview, Subject B 
commented: 
“I watched you present this last time, [and] you got Buy-In 
from the larger group, saying, ‘here are some core areas of 
must-haves and here is some recommended practices ... and 
here are some things to think about.’ I was hoping only for 
the PC stuff. I figured if we [got] to the PC, [then] we 
[could] put another group together that would take that PC 
stuff and then interpret it for the Mac. The fact that you 
came out with Mac’s stuff was just a bonus. The fact that 
you came up with the idea of ‘Well, we’ve also got to 
address this for computers who are dealing with sensitive 
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information ...’ you know, to come up with that was just 
another bonus. Originally, I was just hoping for that first 
list.” 
Subject C felt that the research done in support of 
the procedures led to his total approval of the product. 
Bob: So, based upon what you read on the final report, 
how well do you think that the task force evaluated the 
validity of all the opinions presented to them? 
Subject C: Well, I thought that part was actually 
excellent. You guys brought a strong statistical sense 
of propriety to the project. I think you did an 
excellent job of sampling and representing how deep you 
felt about it. 
His next response underscores how difficult it usually was 
to obtain Buy-In across different branches of a large 
organization. 
Bob:  Did the final conclusions match your 
expectations?   
Subject C:  I thought they were better than I 
expected ... I expected you guys to come out of there 
with broken arms, broken legs ... and one or two of 
you with a slit throat and some fairly non-specific 
recommendations. We were very pleased with the result.” 
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The process of achieving Buy-In can be summed up by 
Subject A, “You have to be collaborative, you have to be 
understanding, and you have to work together. You do not 
have the type of authoritarian dictatorness (there’s a 
title) that you get in business.” 
Implementation 
The approval of the procedures and their acceptance by 
management was only the first step in the implementation 
process. If procedures are not implemented, then their 
existence is of little use. Each part of the implementation 
process required coordination. Management subjects were 
asked what they thought about the process of implementation.  
Bob: So how do you think that the university will 
implement the recommendations of the task force? 
Subject C:  (jokingly) I think we’ll all try to ignore 
that it exists ... That’s probably my job. I need to do 
some kind of major thing: make it part of our weekly 
scans or look for specific recommendations in there and 
see if they are getting done. 
Subject A thought that the implementation should start 
with the centralized portion of IT. “[The] service desk 
ought to be taught how to manage [computers] for the 
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departments. The service desk [sets] the example at Utah 
State University.” 
Subject C also stated that new employees to the 
organization should be given the new procedures as part of 
their hire. “We need to keep [the procedures] up in front 
of [the new hires]. What we need is something that that 
stands for and represents the Network Managers. [When] new 
people coming to the Network Managers, [we can say], 
‘Welcome to [the] Network Managers. Here’s everything you 
need to know right here.' We [didn’t] have that kind of 
thing, [but now we do].” 
One way to implement procedures was to make them a part 
of a person’s daily routine. Subject A stated, “It becomes 
something we use and live by, and I think the more we 
mention it in Network Managers [meeting] and have updates 
once a quarter and keep this a living document, [the more] 
it will have a positive impact. We’ve all said a lot of 
[the] network managers are doing a lot of these things 
already.” 
To make the procedures a “living document,” they must 
be kept up to date. As technology changes, some of the 
procedures may become redundant, not applicable, or simply 
forgotten. Subject C also thought that part of 
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implementation included continually revising the documents. 
Subject C: So how long do you coast before you look at 
it and say, ‘Does anything need to be amended, updated, 
changed, or altered?’ 
 
Bob: That’s a good question and I think that’s one of 
the things I am trying to find out. I think in the 
conclusion section of the report, it stated that it 
needs to be periodically updated and reviewed. 
Subject C: Yeah, obviously—otherwise, it would just 
become a misleading document, and then eventually a 
harmful one. But [it would become] harmful probably 
three or four or five years down the road. 
Subject A wondered about the university as a whole. He 
stated, “[there are] two directions anything like this can 
go. [If it gets] filed [away] and nobody looks at it again, 
bad idea.” 
Ease-Of-Use 
Procedures must be easy for all users to follow, 
whether the user is responsible for an entire computer lab 
or just one computer. If the procedures are not easy for 
everyone to follow, then users will find a way around them, 
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leading to a breakdown in security. The procedures were 
published as a checklist on the USU website retrieved 
January 31, 2013, from 
http://it.usu.edu/policies/htm/computer-management-
policy/computer-management-procedures .  Included next to 
each element is the network managers survey score. The 
website checklist is located in Appendix B. 
Subject B thought that one of the computer management 
procedures’ strengths was that they were organized as a 
checklist. “I can easily say, ‘Okay, here’s what I need to 
do, here’s some I got to have in consideration, and here 
are some other suggested things.' I think it’s very simple 
and in that form the strength is that it’s got a little 
checklist.” 
Subject C also thought that the checklist was helpful. 
“[If you] got a handout that is available at the service 
desk [and you made it] part of the Welcome to USU 
package ... I think it would just become part of the 
university consciousness. I think that would probably do it. 
Something to [give to] new students and something to [hand 
out] at the service desk.” 
Subject A also saw the procedures as a checklist. For 
example, when a non-technical user follows the checklist to 
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set up a new computer, “it helps human error not be a big 
part of the equation.” 
As Subject A was using the checklist component, he 
commented:   
I actually went through and looked at my own desktop 
computer here. I was looking through this morning, and 
I said, “Okay, now what have I done, and what have I 
not done?” There were some things I hadn’t done. I had 
not disabled autorun on my computer. I’m like, “Mmm, I 
better do that.”  I have not renamed my local windows 
[administrator account]. Some of these I either marked 
to do. Some ... I might not have needed. I just haven’t 
done some of them. I’m like, “Oh my gosh, I better 
figure out how to do that one.” So I think to the 
extent that people will use this as a help for 
themselves to not forget something, I think it’s going 
to be fabulous. 
Because the procedures were organized like a checklist, 
they were inherently easy to use. All of the subjects 
mentioned that the procedures in this form would be easy 
for students and others with minimal technical knowledge to 
implement. In a university setting, security procedures 
needed to be implemented not only by management, but also 
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by the students who, with their personal computers, compose 
the bulk of users on the campus network. When a large 
number of users had implemented the procedures, then 
security audits would show whether or not the procedures 
were effective. 
Effectiveness 
Effectiveness of new procedures could only be measured 
after the procedures had been fully implemented. After the 
procedures were approved, subjects were asked about how 
effective they thought the procedures might be.  
Subject B thought that for computers that are managed, 
the procedures would be a labor-saving solution. “This is 
going to be the difference between staying all night and 
going home. So people [will want to] put the upfront time 
into setting that up on those machines.” However, he 
admitted that it would not be the end of all security 
problems at USU. “We see computers all the time that are 
behind in their updates, but 90 percent of them are not 
from computers that are managed.” 
Subject A had a pessimistic view of the probable 
effectiveness of the procedures due to the biases of the 
task force that created them. “I think the decisions in the 
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end were more based on feelings of control and convenience 
rather than security, as evidenced by the difference in 
Windows and Mac [procedures]. I think ... their own 
personal feelings got a little more weight than some of the 
objectives of good computer management.” 
Subject C speculated, “If [the procedures] are 
followed and we are lucky, I think we will keep ... the 
amount of compromise [at the same level] as what we have 
got now.” 
Summary of Qualitative Validation 
The Chain-Link Fence Model was extrapolated from 
observations of the process of creating the computer 
management procedures. The subjects interviewed were hired 
to be the computer managers of the university; they were 
the experts in their field. The three subjects in this 
section had no previous knowledge of the Chain-Link Fence 
Model. In the interviews, the subjects also independently 
validated and confirmed each component of the Chain-Link 
Fence Model. 
Each of the interviewed subjects stated that they 
believed the procedures produced a good result to reduce 
the security threat to the university. They stated that the 
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procedures followed the components established by the 
Chain-Link Fence Model and that those components were what 
helped make the security procedures a successful university 
process.  
Numerical Support for Effectiveness 
The reason for creating security procedures was to 
reduce the threat to the organization. Many organizations 
were required by external policies to conduct security 
threat analyses. For example, as part of the Payment Card 
Industry (PCI) standards version 2.0, outside security 
teams would audit an organization and pretend to present a 
security threat. They would conduct penetration tests upon 
the networks of their clients to probe for weaknesses. Such 
tests are a good measure to evaluate if security procedures 
are adequate and if they are being followed. Therefore to 
test the security of the institution, this research used a 
standard penetration test following the guidelines of PCI 
2.0. 
USU policy #551 states that all computers connected to 
the network must be managed. USU’s policy #555 authorizes 
the USU Security Team to conduct weekly penetration tests. 
These penetration tests show how well USU will stand up to 
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an external hacker's attempt to gain access through the 
public internet. 
Data, Nessus Report 
The product used by USU to facilitate the network 
tests was Nessus. Nessus is a server-side product that is 
configured to probe every port and service on every IP 
address in a network. It discovers potential 
vulnerabilities by using a steady stream of plug-ins that 
enable the server to access potential security threats in 
computer systems. The bulk of these threats are: 
• Computers that are hard-coding an IP address that does 
not belong to the computer. 
• Devices that disrupt network operations. 
• Computers that are missing critical system patches. 
• Accessible “Administrator” or “root” usernames with no 
password. 
• Embedded appliances with critical, unpatched 
vulnerabilities. 
• Printers that are on public (129.123.0.0/16) IP 
addresses and are not supposed to offer printing 
services to the internet. 
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• Computers that expose or compromise USU credentials. 
This includes: 
o Failing to protect passwords. 
o Failing to protect stored password hashes 
o Computers that take no action in the presence of 
excessive password guessing 
• Other equipment that exposes USU credentials. This 
includes: 
o Equipment that replicates and transmits USU 
credential in cleartext. 
o Old vulnerable backup devices. 
o Critical vulnerabilities in older versions of 
McAfee, Apache web server, SSH, and PHP 
webscripting 
o Other software with critical vulnerabilities. 
o Unsupported OS. (Retrieved January 31, 2013 from 
https://it.wiki.usu.edu/20100513_Nessus_Test) 
Analysis of the Data 
Permission was granted to use the old data from the 
academic school year 2009-2010. On January 20, 2012, the 
archives of the Network Managers list was analyzed by 
pulling out each week’s vulnerability list for the date 
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ranges of this study. Permission was granted from the USU 
IT Security Team to use this data, as they deemed it too 
old to be of any further threat to the organization. 
The following are the results of the Nessus 
penetration test. The USU IT Security Team took the 
computers that Nessus identified as vulnerable and then 
purged any false positives from these results. 
Upon compilation of the data, there were multiple gaps 
in the results. There should have been either four or five 
scans during any one month period. As seen in Figure 4, 
most months only have two entries per month. 
 
Figure 4. Vulnerable computers on the Nessus report. 
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On February 11, 2010 the USU Network Managers group 
approved the computer management procedures. The data prior 
to February was too incomplete to perform a valid test. As 
shown in Figure 4, there was a substantial reduction 
between Late August and Early September 2009 compared to 
March and April 2010, but too many points of data were lost 
to make any statistical conclusions. 
Measuring Conclusion 
While there is not sufficient statistical support for 
any test, there is anecdotal evidence that the 
implementation of the security procedures did reduce the 
security threat at USU. Computer managers confirmed through 
interviews that they believed the procedures were effective 
and labor-saving. Subject C stated that, “I believe that we 
are doing a better job [reducing compromise] than we ever 
have before.” Subject B talked about the labor-savings, “I 
see people who have got a lot of machines to run, 200 or 
more, that this [the computer management procedures] is 
just going to save their bacon.” This helps demonstrate 
that the Effectiveness component of the Chain-Link Fence 
Model was necessary to reducing the overall security threat 
footprint of the organization.   
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VALIDATION OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL PART 2: USING THE 
CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL TO CREATE SECURITY PROCEDURES AT 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
Procedure Development Using the Chain-Link Fence Model 
Utah State University is unique, given the distributed 
nature of information technology. While USU has centralized 
servers, services, and top-to-bottom management, it also 
has several departments and colleges that maintain their 
own IT teams. While there are drawbacks to this system, 
they are overshadowed by the benefits. Subject A stated it 
best: 
“Utah State University will never, if I have anything 
to say about it, be absolutely fully centralized with IT 
with absolutely everything and anything that has to do with 
information technology because it doesn’t make sense. The 
things that make sense for centralization are those things 
which are used commonly, relatively equally across, say, 80 
to 90 percent of the institution. Those [are the] things 
that make sense to centralize and pass on [as a] common 
service. There are a million things at this university and 
millions and millions of dollars worth of things at this 
University that are very specific to certain disciplines 
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and certain processes [that] the rest of the university 
[couldn’t] care less about. Those situations should not be 
restricted at all by any form of centralization at Utah 
State University. Centralization should assist them so they 
don’t have to focus on some commoditized things, but that’s 
as far as it should go. Ownership, the funding, the systems, 
the processes that are specific and not generalizable at 
the University, I believe should always be at the edge. 
Otherwise needs won’t be met.” 
In order for each department to “be at the edge,” 
their IT professionals needed to have the freedom to create 
internal IT security policies and procedures. 
The Interview Process 
Throughout January of 2011, the Chain-Link Fence Model 
was taught to four additional subjects, subjects D through 
G (see Appendix D). They were then asked to use the model 
to create security procedures for their respective labs. 
They responded by using the model to create procedures as 
well as performing other duties related to their jobs. 
During 2011, Subjects D through G were interviewed about 
their experiences using the Chain-Link Fence Model. 
Subjects were asked about how they used parts of the 
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Chain-Link Fence Model for their computer labs. Buy-In for 
a computer lab was more complex than that of an 
organization. There were two different groups that needed 
to cooperate with the departmental procedures: Buy-In for 
the managers was easy because they wrote the procedures and 
Buy-In for lab consultants was slightly harder because they 
needed to be taught the hows and whys of the procedures. In 
the case of a computer lab, the users fit the traditional 
customer role of a business rather than the service role. 
This made them more adversarial to the Buy-In process. 
In relation to Implementation, questions were asked 
about training procedures for the labs. For Ease-of-use, 
subjects were asked how their labs related to a users’ home 
experience and how they thought their labs were similar or 
different. Effectiveness for each case is discussed as a 
whole at the end of the cases. 
Case Study 1, Security Incident Response 
and Time Limit Procedures 
Subject D managed all the computers in the computer 
science department. His computer lab, an open-access lab, 
consisted of 150 computers. He had a unique challenge among 
campus lab managers in that his computers needed to be as 
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open as possible so that students could explore all facets 
of the computing environment. This created some issues, 
especially with computer security.  
The students in Subject D’s lab often behaved like 
typical hackers. They tried to learn what was going on in 
the computer environment. This included attempting to spoof 
IP addresses, changing root level file structures, and in 
some cases, attempting to present themselves as a different 
user. 
One of the main differences between his lab 
environment and all the others was the fact that it was an 
anonymous lab. There was not a centralized authentication 
system requirement for entry; most of the computers had 
root or administrator access set as the default user 
credentials. Finally, they did not have the usual 
firewalled and sectioned-off subnets found in other open-
access labs on campus. As Subject D stated, “The systems 
are somewhat open because in computer science, we’ve got 
students that have to develop a lot of programs where they 
need a fair amount of resources off the Internet. They need 
to be able to come back after they’ve worked on it and keep 
working on a project.” 
When a breach in security was detected, Subject D 
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created (using the Chain-Link Fence Model) a standard 
procedure for processing the problem computer. He 
summarized this procedure: “We do let USU computer security 
indicate if somebody is doing something out of the ordinary, 
and then we reimage the computers. If we catch anyone doing 
something that is a security breach we just reimage the 
computers [and] bring it back to a known operative state. 
The students are warned before they go in that they do have 
open computers because of their development platforms, and 
they have to police themselves.” 
While this environment seems like the Wild Wild West 
of computer environments to most computer security 
professionals, designed procedures helped keep the chaos to 
a minimum. “We do have firewalls on each of the systems 
which we use: standard Windows 7 and Macintosh and Linux 
firewalls. We allow basically any [outgoing traffic]. [We] 
usually limit incoming [traffic] so students can’t run 
their own applications unless we poke a hole in the 
firewalls. That’s about all we do, because again, they 
still need to access resources off campus as they’re 
developing some of their distribution software.” 
Subject D used the Chain-Link Fence Model for the 
creation of a time-limit procedure.  
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Subject D: If we’ve got someone who is in [the lab] 
for an extended period of time, the lab mangers ... or 
the consultants ask them what they are doing ... We 
give them about three hours, mainly because the games 
players come in, play for like six [hours]. So after 
about three hours we ask them what they’re doing. 
Normally, they feel intimidated and get up and leave, 
but the games players are the worst case. Most of the 
rest of the students are in and out of the lab in 
about an hour to two. 
Buy-in. In his lab, Subject D needed his lab managers 
to assist him in enforcing these new procedures. “We 
discuss those at the first of the school year like we did 
at the end of August. [We review] what’s [been] implemented 
[and] anything that’s changed in the campus infrastructure 
during the summer, and they’re basically the policeman of 
the of the lab operations.” 
Implementation. One of the primary concerns for 
Subject D was the students. He wanted to make sure that the 
students knew what the procedures of the lab included. To 
that end he has training sessions with the students. “I 
think we have enough ... training for the incoming students 
to warn them enough if they ... start doing anything 
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malicious that they will be out of the program, and they 
usually watch fairly closely. So ... we’ve had them in the 
past, but in the last eight years up here we’ve ... not had 
a documented case of malice.” 
When discussing implementation Subject D also stated 
that he was also implementing the Utah State University 
security procedures. 
“[I implement the procedures outlined by USU] as close as 
possible, other than possibly the Deep Freeze issue.” Deep 
Freeze is a program used to prevent anybody from altering 
any part of a computer system. It is a third-party 
application that forces the computers to return to a 
predefined and static state upon reboot. He continued, 
“Some lab managers use it; Engineering has [used it] a 
little bit, but they have found the same thing that I have-
-that the students get limited ... to what they can do in 
some of their development. And so I’ve opted to move away 
from it just because we have enough changes during the 
semester [that] make it just hard for them to manage. But 
typically, as far as security monitoring, I follow the 
guidelines that we’ve created on the Managers list... The 
Deep Freeze is probably the trickiest just because it 
[doesn’t seem] complicated, but it requires a complete 
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reimage of the lab. If we need to make any changes or if 
the students need particular updates and so on so forth, 
[the lab would have to create a specialized procedure to 
handle the request under a Deep Freeze environment]. 
Ease-of-use. In Subject D's lab, the systems were as 
wide open as possible. This gave the student users a chance 
to explore their systems to further their education. This 
helped them feel knowledgeable with their use of the 
systems. Subject D wanted his lab to be run with focus on 
ease-of-use for his students. 
Bob: If you were to compare your lab computers to a 
user’s home computer, how are they similar? And how 
are they different? Let’s start with similar. 
Subject D:  Similar in the fact that they are fairly 
open. A user’s home computer ... is fairly open. [We 
have] an unlimited firewall as far as outgoing, so 
they can go anywhere they want. [There are] some 
limitations on the incoming [firewall and] on ... the 
university’s border firewall. Where they [the lab 
computers] would be different is [that] a home user’s 
computer probably isn’t monitored for patch updates. 
People don’t necessarily look down at the [system tray] 
to see if it’s up to date. With lab computers, the 
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consultants go around and make sure that the scans are 
all happening either automatically or [forced]. A home 
computer user is not necessarily going to look for 
security updates or virus scanning spyware updates and 
probably also isn’t necessarily going to look for 
required updates to the computer that don’t happen 
automatically. [Also,] some of the optional updates 
that still could be security related ... may not be 
updated on a home computer. 
Case Study 2, Joining a Central Domain  
Subject E managed the computers in the College of 
Humanities and Social Sciences. His users mostly used the 
computers for composing papers, creating news stories, or 
blogging. In contrast to the computer science department, 
Subject E’s users were complete novices in computer 
security. 
Bob: How would you rate your users’ knowledge of 
information security? 
Subject E: I would probably say close to zero. As new 
freshman are coming in, I’m not sure that they have 
much knowledge of security and policies regarding that 
[security]. 
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Consequently, he felt that it was his duty to keep his 
systems secure for the users, which resulted in his 
computers being some of the most locked down systems on 
campus. He achieved this by following these procedures 
created using the Chain-Link Fence Model: 
1. All computers were connected to the college domain. 
This ensured that accounts and print counts could 
be managed centrally. 
2. All computers were required to have Deep Freeze 
installed on them.  
3. All computers were connected to the System Center 
Configuration Manager (SCCM) server. This ensured 
that most of the university computer management 
procedures were being met. 
4. All computers were reimaged at the beginning of 
each academic school year. 
All of these steps ensured that none of the systems had 
any trace of customization by the users of the systems. 
This had the added benefit of forcing most of the 
configuration work upfront. This type of lab management 
comes from a belief that the greatest security threat is 
from within. 
Bob: What would you say is the greatest security threat 
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to your lab? 
Subject E: The greatest security threat to our lab is a 
knowledgeable student that might know how to disable 
Deep Freeze and install things. 
Bob: You’re saying an internal hacker? 
Subject E: Yeah. I don’t foresee an external hacker 
getting in too easily and permanently making any 
changes. 
Buy-in. The use of the utility Deep Freeze forces the 
computers to not have the ability to save any data to the 
hard drive. This caused Subject E the most difficulty in 
terms of buy-in from the users. He stated that the extreme 
security measures that they take cause some complaints. 
“Once in a while we get a complaint that ... they [the 
users] can’t save anything to the computers.” 
Ease-of-use. Subject E's labs were closed tight, only 
allowing very limited use of the computer environment. This 
could have an effect on the abilities of the users to 
operate the computer. 
Bob: If you were to compare your lab to a user’s home 
computer how, is the experience similar, and how is 
the experience different? 
Subject E: Let’s start with how it’s different. Most 
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home computers don’t need to log in; that’s just how 
it is. There is generally no password on a home 
computer, and here you have to have a login to get 
into it. Also on our lab computers, [users] can’t save 
anything at all. On a home computer, you can save 
whatever you want, including viruses and malware and 
everything. Those are the main differences. How it’s 
similar is [that] they can browse the web [and] they 
can print just like they would be able to at home. So 
that pretty much covers it. 
Implementation. When a computer was joined to the 
university domain, the user account lost the ability to 
have administrative privileges. This caused the user to not 
be able to install software, printers, and other advanced 
computers settings. Subject E was asked him how this 
affected the implementation of his procedures: 
Bob: Do you follow all of the [procedures] as created? 
Subject E: I would say 90 percent of them. 
Bob: Okay, which procedures are the most difficult for 
you to maintain or follow? 
Subject E: I would say the one we’re having the most 
difficulty with is having users not have administrator 
privileges. We’re doing okay on Windows machines, but 
107 
 
 
   
 
on Mac, people tend to have a mentality that they 
should have complete control over their Macintosh 
system. So I would say that is the top of the list of 
[procedures] that are difficult to follow. 
Case Study 3, Standard Security Response Procedures  
Subject F's situation was unique given that he was the 
sole manager at the departmental level. While the other 
subjects had lab consultants, Subject F was the sole 
administrator for his lab. His lab consisted of 30 
Macintosh computers. The users of his lab had a unique log-
on that was enforced by an Open-Directory Domain. The 
computers were unique due to the fact that he had them set 
in dual boot configurations with Microsoft Windows. Each of 
his Windows installations was a stand-alone workstation 
without access to a central server.  
Subject F kept the default guest account on his 
computers to help facilitate sharing of information between 
registered and non-registered users of his lab. The guest 
account could not save to either the server or locally to 
the computer itself. The use of the guest account was for 
log-on purposes only. 
The majority of his users were students that 
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specialize in using technology in the education field. He 
had about 150 people use his lab in a given week. In 
addition, many classes were held in the lab. 
His approach to security was as follows: “I kind of 
look at security as [encompassing] both information 
[security] and physical [security]. So [on] the physical 
security side, there [are] locks on both doors, and the 
only people who are allowed in there are those who have 
access codes, which they are given the first day of school. 
I don’t hand out the codes. The codes are handed out by 
either by the instructor or the office staff so they can 
verify that they are a student, because I don’t have access 
to that information.” 
“Information security--I guess I don’t really worry 
too much about it just because of the way I’ve got these 
accounts set up so that they can’t do anything. But if they 
do, then I usually catch it ... I can know who is logged in 
when they are logged in. If anything goes wrong with [the 
computers], it’s just a reboot that refreshes it. So 
there’s not a whole lot there that I worry about, mostly 
‘cause they are using [the] Mac side.” When questioned why 
he did not worry about information security, he responded, 
“I just let the university handle most of that because I am 
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not really equipped to do it.” 
In his office, Subject F set up a computer workstation 
with multiple displays. On each display were 30 open 
windows. Each window corresponded to one of the computers 
in the lab. He was able to see at a glance what is being 
displayed on each computer. 
His specialized setup was created in response to the 
lab’s greatest threat, Bit Torrent. Bit Torrent is a peer-
to-peer file sharing protocol that can be used to quickly 
distribute copyrighted material. 
Subject F: Bit Torrent was the issue we had last year 
[when] one of our instructors was teaching and using 
Windows. [A student] discovered that [the lab] has a 
really fast internet connection in there. What they 
did is they’d log in as just as a standard user. They 
logged in as a student and they used about twelve 
machines and started downloading all kinds of crap. I 
got the message from [the copyright compliance 
security team member] and he said ‘[we got a DMCA 
violation],’ and I said, ‘It’s a lab. I’ve no idea 
who’s logged in there, and all I can do is just clean 
them up.’ And he says ‘Okay.’ But what created the 
problem [was Windows being able] to log into the 
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servers. [I need to] have them connected to a domain 
so that I can restrict those users as I do the Mac 
users. [I have the computer set up to] log in and 
they’re standard users now, [but] sometimes the 
student needs the ability to do some installations. I 
have to allow that on a case-by case-basis. [With] 
Windows, most things you install you have to restart. 
Bob: So can you just run Deep Freeze? 
Subject F: If you’ve got Deep Freeze installed it just 
wipes out everything they have, so it’s a different 
animal. But ... I need to know who’s logged in and 
when, so that’s what I’ve been trying to solve. 
Subject F created the following procedure to help 
manage his lab: 
1. create Location Based Names, 
2. create DNS entries on Aggies domain, 
3. create deployment image, 
4. re-image the computers, 
5. verify with [RADIUS server administrator] that 
authentication works, and 
6. verify that Aggies Domain services are correct. 
Buy-in. As with Subject E, Subject F joined the 
Windows installations to the university domain, once again 
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removing administrative privileges from the computers. 
Subject F recalled a problem with Buy-In. 
Subject F: I would say those who want to use Windows 
don’t like the fact that they can’t do installations 
or make some changes to tweak stuff. We have 
[suggestion cards] from the students [saying] they 
like to do things that are more advanced that they 
can’t do in a regular lab. So my lab gets used as a 
guinea pig quite a bit. They [may not] like the fact 
that they have to come ask me to install something ... 
but they get it over it ... they kind of understand. 
Bob: How many complaints do you get in any given week? 
Subject F: I’d say maybe one or two per semester. 
Bob:  Ok, so one or two per semester.  
Subject F: It’s really low--I think ... with the 
advanced understanding of the students and faculty, 
they understand what the issues are [and] why it needs 
to be that way. 
Ease-of-use. The computer lab that Subject F managed 
catered to two different groups of users. The first was the 
traditional student users (i.e., students who used the lab 
to work on their projects, papers, and other school work). 
The second user group was the instructors. They used the 
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lab to teach students and, as a result, had a different 
standard for ease-of-use. Subject F's computer lab was 
Macintosh based. 
Bob: If you were to compare your lab to one of your 
users’ home computers, what would you say are their 
similarities and their differences? 
Subject F: Biggest difference is my machines are 
clean--very clean. There’s no extraneous software, 
there’s no orphans there’s no stuff left behind. The 
similarities: I try to create an environment that 
looks and acts as much like a home computer as 
possible. So the only difference is when they’re 
logged in, they’re working off a server. But it 
doesn’t look that way, so that’s the thing ... you’d 
call it a similarity, but yet it’s a difference at the 
same time. But as far these machines compared to their 
home machines? These ones run a lot better. 
Implementation. Due to the fact that Subject F ran the 
lab alone, the implementation of policy was very straight 
forward. However, teaching his users how this policy would 
affect them was a little more difficult. 
Bob: How much training do you provide your users?  
Subject F: I’ll meet with [the instructors] before the 
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semester starts and let them know what’s happening, 
and then I’ll expect them to [see] if it affects the 
students. [I] let them explain it to [the students] 
and let them do it. [As a result], the normal users 
hardly at all ... knock on my door and ask for some 
help. 
Bob: So you train the faculty in any new things, 
changes, or anything [else] to the lab, and you expect 
the faculty then teach their students who are using 
the lab those changes? 
Subject F: Because it seems like the information gets 
to the students a lot better that way. 
Subject F stated that the total amount of time to train the 
faculty was around an hour, while the first day of classes 
was spent training the students. 
Case Study 4, Computer Refresh Policy  
Subject G had the largest number of computer labs and 
the largest number of computers. His labs accounted for 80 
percent of all the open access labs across the campus. He 
created policies to deal with the sheer volume of students 
that used his lab computers. Over 3500 students used his 
system every day. With that many users, he needed 
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procedures that ensured that students could always have 
access to a computer to complete their work. 
Bob: So how many people help you manage all of your 
labs? 
Subject G: There are 82 of them. 
Bob: Are there assistant lab managers? What are their 
job titles and responsibilities? 
Subject G: There are 82 consultants that man the 
facilities throughout the area. Then I have six peer 
managers. And these peer managers help me out with the 
PC, the Mac, HR, supplies, training, [and] public 
relations.  
Subject G articulated the greatest security threat to 
his lab: “From my point of view, it’s the physical security, 
but from the student’s point of view, it’s being 
compromised.” 
After reading the university’s computer management 
policy, Subject G realized that he needed to create 
specific procedures. He was asked to use the Chain-Link 
Fence Model to guide their creation. He agreed and came up 
with the following procedures: 
Computer cycle between users policy. It became the 
policy of this lab that computers not in use for more than 
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15 minutes would be recycled to a refreshed state. 
This policy was supported by the following procedures:  
1. the computers will have a self-timer installed so 
they reboot automatically after 15 minutes of idle, 
2. the computer will use Deep Freeze to ensure that 
the state of the computer is free from any user’s 
customization, and 
3. lab consultants will make sure that any computer 
not in use will be at the log-on screen.  
Subject G reported that these new procedures accomplished 
his goal of making more computers available to users. 
Buy-In. Subject G had multiple lab consultants, and he 
indicated no problems with their Buy-In to the program. He 
also stated that most of the issue with lab consultant Buy-
In was handled in the multiple training sessions that they 
conducted.  
Bob: Do your lab managers support your lab policies? 
Subject G: Yes. 
Bob: I mean, and I’m not talking about forcible 
[acceptance]. Overall, do they understand why you’re 
doing what you are doing? 
Subject G: Yes, they are trained. We do training quite 
heavily at the first of the year.  
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Ease-of-use. Each student who used an on-campus 
computer lab had a different computing experience, 
depending on which departmental lab they chose to use. 
Because all of the lab managers had some students 
using their computers, they were then questioned about 
the students’ experiences.  
Lab managers made their computers easy for students to 
use by making them look and feel as much as possible like a 
home computer. To make a lab easy to use and manage for 
consultants, lab managers needed to provide proper training.  
Subject G had the most lab consultants. We discussed 
how he trained his consultants in order to make the labs 
easy for them to use and manage. 
Bob: You mentioned previously that [for lab manager 
training] you’ve got the four hours once a month and 
on Saturdays, and you’ve got the eight hours at the 
beginning of the semester. 
Subject G: Correct 
Bob: how much of that training time is dedicated to 
security? And so, what I’m asking is how long does it 
take to train your managers, your lab managers, in 
regards to security-related issues? 
Subject G: I would say out of those first two 
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meetings ... about an hour in the first meeting in 
September, and another hour in the second meeting in 
September for everyone. So the first one is for new 
consultants only, they get about an hour, I’d say 
maybe an hour and a half training on security. Then 
the next week with all the staff, you get about an 
hour of security training. Then every month there is 
probably ... ten to fifteen minutes of discussion 
about security. 
Implementation. The labs were a vital part of the 
university's overall mission to educate its students. The 
university adopted security policies and procedures to 
ensure that students had the most secure environment 
possible in which to work. Procedures could not be 
effective unless they are implemented. Subjects were asked 
how closely they followed the university’s computer 
management procedures. 
Bob: Your lab managers, do they support your lab 
policies? 
Subject G: Yes. 
Bob: I mean, and I’m not talking about forcible, I’m 
talking about like overall, do they understand why 
you’re doing what you are doing? 
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Subject G: Yes, they are trained. We do training quite 
heavily at the first of the year. We do ... a whole 
bunch of training.” 
Subject G: “The first staff meeting we have, we have 
[name] come in from Affirmative Action and talk about 
sexual harassment prevention. We have [name] come in 
and talk about PCI compliance and [personally 
identifying information], and all of that. We talk 
about that. Then we have [name] from the registrar’s 
office to talk about FERPA [Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act]. And those are some [of the] 
trainings that we bring people in to do to talk about 
certain things. Then we have our own training on 
security. How [we] handle certain things. The first 
training meeting is about six hours on the first 
Saturday for the new staff. Then we have the six hour 
training again the following Saturday for all of the 
staff, returning and new. And we continue ... 
training ... and security has been one [of the topics] 
that, over the years, has come to the top all of the 
time. It just, keeps coming up higher and higher and 
been talked about almost every time on different parts 
of security for the students. 
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Bob: So how much training do you provide your staff 
versus how much do you have to provide all the way 
down to the user level? 
Subject G: The staff ... is trained heavily the first 
month. Thereafter, it’s four hours, once a month on 
Saturday mornings. And what was your second part of 
your question? 
Bob:  How much training do you provide to your users? 
Subject G: [I wish we could do more]. [The University 
IT] fair ... that was wonderful. That was good 
training... We have some tutorials out there for them. 
Other than that, I don’t think there is much training 
at all. 
Bob: Your user base is 16,000 students. So, what 
resources do you provide to train your students?  
Subject G: Oh ok, yeah we do a little bit. We do have 
Connections (USU’s freshman and new student 
orientation program). We do Connections where we 
get ... 1800 hundred students [mostly] freshman. We 
have an hour with them at the beginning before school 
starts in the fall, where we have an hour of training 
on IT technology, and we go over a whole bunch of 
things ... Security is a big part of that [training]. 
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We go over emails, what to watch for in [email]. We go 
over a whole bunch of stuff that covers IT, more than 
just security. [We also discuss] IT technology and 
what’s offered [as services to the students] and where 
to go find things and look for things.  
Review of the Effectiveness of the Chain-Link Fence Model 
in Procedure Creation of All Four Cases 
 
 
As stated previously, the effectiveness of security 
procedures could only be measured after the procedures had 
been fully implemented. This could be accomplished using an 
audit system. The university used the Nessus product to 
conduct a weekly penetration test on every computer 
connected to the university network. 
Each lab manager was asked how often his computers are 
listed as “vulnerable” or “problem” computers on the Nessus 
scan. This data helped indicate whether or not their 
security procedures were working. All of the interviewed 
subjects stated that over the past year, none of their lab 
computers had come up on the Nessus scan. They were then 
asked if any of the other computers that they maintained 
for their departments came up on the scan. Everyone 
reported that about one or two per month.  
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The issues that most commonly caused the subjects’ 
computers to appear on the Nessus scan were mostly resolved 
by the implementation of their new procedures. Subjects 
were asked if they currently had any compromised computers 
that they knew about. Subject D had a major issue with one 
of his main servers. It was discovered that a computer that 
was used to submit homework had its root username and 
password hacked by an IP address originating in China. The 
USU IT Security team discovered this compromise using a 
statistical analysis to find anomalies in SSH patterns. SSH 
is a program used to remotely control a computer running 
the Unix operating system. 
The compromised server acted as a rogue IRC bot and 
tried to infect other computers across the campus. More 
than 30 man-hours went into resolving this problem. Subject 
D reported that, luckily, this server did not include any 
personal identifying information.  
It is important to note that this security episode was 
the only report of a compromised computer (out of the four 
subjects questioned) during the course of an entire year. 
That single computer was out of the 150 lab computers and 
100 faculty and staff computers that Subject D managed. 
This supports the supposition that the procedures created 
122 
 
 
   
 
using the Chain-Link Fence Model created a safe computing 
environment. 
Conclusion of the Case Studies 
Computer security is a goal for any size organization. 
The labs in these case studies, while part of a larger 
organization, demonstrated how effective procedures could 
help reduce the exposure of small computing environments to 
security threats. The use of the Chain-Link Fence Model in 
these labs helped the lab managers come up with solutions 
to security problems. They found the model to be effective 
in producing the results that they were aiming to achieve. 
These new security procedures were recognized by the 
managers as beneficial and helped reduced their overall 
security footprint. The procedures were used by the 
managers and users to great success. As more of these new 
security procedures come on line, the entire organization’s 
IS security will likely increase both from the reduction of 
threats and also from user awareness. While some users 
complain about the less convenient use of some computers, 
the users of these labs see these new security procedures 
and are educated about the benefits of good information 
technology security.  
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A final comment about the case study is that the 
Chain-Link Fence Model was a useful tool to help design and 
create security procedures. The Chain-Link Fence Model 
helped users realize their unstated goal of wanting to 
ensure that their computer use was protected and secure.  
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Summary of the Chain-Link Fence Model and its Validation 
The Chain-Link Fence Model (CLFM) is a four component 
model to help information technology security specialists 
design and implement new, effective, and creative security 
procedures for their organizations. Information technology 
security once concerned only hard-wired computers. In the 
recent past, it has ballooned to encompass wired and 
wireless computers, as well as other wireless consumer 
devices that have a primary function other than that of a 
computer. Televisions, video games, cell phones, and even 
books in the form of electronic readers have now become 
devices that are able to transmit data over the internet. 
As technology continues to change, there will continue to 
be a need for security procedures to be created and revised.  
The Chain-Link Fence Model was developed to be 
replicable. Each of the components, Buy-In, Implementation, 
Ease-of-use, and Effectiveness, were derived from both 
previous research and knowledge gained over lifetimes of 
experience. The model and its components, when used as a 
framework, help create information technology security 
procedures.  
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This model was validated in two parts. The first part 
validated the individual components using expert knowledge. 
The second part validated the entire model and the 
capabilities thereof. The first validation helped give 
cohesion to the model as a whole.  
The managers’ experience with the Chain-Link Fence 
Model, as stated in the interviews, showed that the 
components of the Chain-Link Fence Model, Buy-In, 
Implementation, Ease-of-Use, and Effectiveness, facilitated 
the creation of the new security procedures that in turn 
were well understood by both the users of the systems.  
Conclusions 
Conclusion 1: The usefulness of the CLFM is a consequence 
of its origin in theory, observation, and IT professional 
insight. 
The Chain-Link Fence Model was a valuable tool in 
helping create and implement security policies and 
procedures. The model and its components were developed 
based on careful study of related literature and on the 
author’s personal observations. The synthesis of previous 
theoretical results and the author’s practical experiences 
resulted in the parsimonious model where all components 
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were essential, interconnected, and sufficient to achieve 
the stated goal of providing guidelines for the development 
of new security policies and procedures.  
The experts stated that each component would help the 
culture of the university accept the security procedures. 
In the second validation part, some experienced members in 
information technology security at Utah State University 
used their training in Chain-Link Fence Model to develop 
new security policies for their specific situations. They 
stated that CLFM was useful in helping them form the new 
security procedures. These managers, using their expertise 
to create procedures using this model, were instrumental in 
determining the model’s usefulness in their individual 
domains. 
Conclusion 2: The Chain-Link Fence Model is a scalable 
model for the creation of security procedures in large or 
small computer environments. 
Through the creation of a set of four new, diverse 
examples of security procedures it was demonstrated that 
one could use the Chain-Link Fence Model to create 
procedures for labs and networks of varying sizes. Lab 
managers at USU used the Chain-Link Fence Model to create 
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procedures for small computing environments with one lab 
composed of only 25 computers. The computer lab managers 
stated that the computers they managed did not appear on 
the weekly vulnerability assessment with the help of their 
security procedures they developed using the Chain-Link 
Fence Model. In both the large and small cases, the 
policies and procedures were positively correlated with the 
reductions of the security threat footprints that appeared 
on the university’s security tests and measures.  
Conclusion 3: The Chain-Link Fence Model may reduce the 
effort needed to create and implement procedures. 
The computer lab managers using the Chain-Link Fence 
Model stated that once they had created the procedures, 
they were able to train their staff and faculty in as 
little as one or two training sessions and no training 
whatsoever in one case. This helped get the procedures out 
to the front lines in less time, resulting in quicker, more 
effective security threat reduction. These four examples 
suggested that using the Chain-Link Fence Model can reduce 
the time and perhaps cost required to develop security 
procedures.  
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Weaknesses 
While it is clear from the interviews that the users 
of the Chain-Link Fence Model found the model effective, 
the design and nature of this study does not provide 
statistical evidence to support that claim. A new study 
design could focus upon gathering hard data to establish 
quantitative evidence. For such an undertaking to be 
effective, data collection will need to concentrate on 
gathering sufficient data from before and after the 
implementation of newly developed security policies. 
A second weakness of the study arises from the nature 
of the university environment where the study was conducted. 
Any security breach related data collected between the 
months of May and August would be biased, due to the fact 
that usage rate falls dramatically during the academic 
break period. There are significantly fewer students on 
campus during the summer, and therefore, far fewer 
computers are connected to the network. This would cause 
any samples from those dates to bias the results. However, 
this could be partially offset by a seasonally adjusted 
usage rate. Any such considerations were outside of the 
scope of this study.  
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A final weakness is that the Chain-Link Fence model 
was validated and tested at only one university environment. 
While this creates an excellent environment for conducting 
research, any conclusion drawn from the research can only 
be directly applicable to that one university. For a full, 
complete evaluation, the Chain-Link Fence Model needs to be 
tested on other types of organizations.  
Future Research 
In the future, this study could be replicated in 
different organizational settings. The CLFM was used in 
large and small environments, but because the small 
environments tested were a part of the larger, there was 
only a relatively small variation in organizational culture 
and management structure. The university studied was a 
large public university. Smaller private universities and 
colleges face different overall threats to their external 
security. Most small private universities focus on a 
traditional liberal arts education. As a result, external 
hackers would mainly see them as a source of computing 
resources rather than as a source of a large body of 
research. Other environments such as hospitals, secure 
laboratories, and other large entities could benefit by 
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applying the Chain-Link Fence Model for IT security to 
their institutions. These institutions could be selected 
due to the similar requirements of data on their 
institutions. After applying the Chain-Link Fence Model at 
these institutions, the research could then be expanded to 
broader business and industry environments as well. 
Additionally, the Chain-Link Fence Model could be 
studied further: refinement of each of the four components, 
path analysis of each of the components and how they relate 
to each other, and finally, exploration of possible 
additional components that may emerge in different 
environments than the one presented. 
Each component of the Chain-Link Fence Model could be 
analyzed to see whether there are any sub-points within 
each component. Additionally, future studies could identify 
possible overlapping points in subcomponent. These 
subcomponents could include instructions or provisions for 
testing each of the main components during the creation of 
the procedures. These subcomponents could be used to design 
a more detailed outline for the creation of security 
procedures. 
The Chain-Link Fence Model is a model to help 
organizations reach their security goals. This model is 
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just one tool that information technology security 
professionals can use to help accomplish their goals. 
Models and security research only explain human behavior. 
The true goal of any security professional is to understand 
how humans interact and to realize that technology is just 
part of the communication of human society. 
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APPENDIX B: Security Setup  
Windows Standard Setup 
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the 
inclusion of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional. 
Required 
Rating 
Average 
Install/configure anti-virus software 4.95 
Configure automatic Windows updates 4.80 
Register IP address in OpenIPAM 4.55 
Install/configure firewall software 4.37 
Update drivers 4.27 
Disable the local Windows Guest account 4.12 
Disable auto-run 3.39 
Recommended  
Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration) 3.94 
Convert file system to NTFS 3.91 
Uninstall "bloatware" 3.79 
Install/configure anti-malware software 3.79 
Install/configure SCCM 3.29 
Reformat hard drive and install Windows from scratch 3.11 
Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account 3.05 
Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater) 3.05 
Disable all unnecessary services (e.g., utilize Windows Baseline Security Analyzer) 2.94 
Rename local Administrator account 2.52 
Disable Administrator account 1.85 
Optional  
Employ a backup solution (e.g., shadow copy, store-to-network, portable external drive) 2.94 
Configure services to use non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop) 2.88 
Employ security-related group policies via Active Directory (i.e., join Windows domain) 2.82 
Install/disallow certain web browsers 2.82 
Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in) 2.69 
Configure power management options 2.68 
Employ security-related local group policies 2.60 
Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia Personal Software Inspector) 2.52 
Install Windows from an actively maintained image (e.g., Ghost) 2.50 
Install Windows from scratch with slipstreamed service packs and/or patches 2.41 
Rename the local Windows Guest account 2.41 
Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account 2.40 
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Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history 2.20 
Encrypt the hard drive 1.33 
Windows High Security Setup 
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the inclusion 
of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional. 
Required 
Rating 
Average 
Install/configure anti-virus software 4.95 
Configure automatic Windows updates 4.80 
Register IP address in OpenIPAM 4.55 
Install/configure firewall software 4.37 
Update drivers 4.27 
Disable the local Windows Guest account 4.12 
Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration) 3.94 
Convert file system to NTFS 3.91 
Install/configure anti-malware software 3.79 
Disable auto-run 3.39 
Reformat hard drive and install Windows from scratch 3.11 
Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account 2.40 
Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history (e.g., temp Internet files, cookies, history, 
form data, passwords) 2.20 
Disable Administrator account 1.85 
Encrypt the hard drive 1.33 
  
Recommended  
Uninstall "bloatware" 3.79 
Install/configure SCCM 3.29 
Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account 3.05 
Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater) 3.05 
Disable all unnecessary services (e.g., utilize Windows Baseline Security Analyzer) 2.94 
Rename local Administrator account 2.52 
  
Optional  
Employ a backup solution (e.g., shadow copy, store-to-network, portable external drive) 2.94 
Configure services to use non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop) 2.88 
Employ security-related group policies via Active Directory (i.e., join Windows domain) 2.82 
Install/disallow certain web browsers 2.82 
Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in) 2.69 
Configure power management options 2.68 
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Employ security-related local group policies 2.60 
Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia Personal Software Inspector) 2.52 
Install Windows from an actively maintained image (e.g., Ghost) 2.50 
Install Windows from scratch with slipstreamed service packs and/or patches 2.41 
Rename the local Windows Guest account 2.41 
 
Macintosh Standard Setup 
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the inclusion 
of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional. 
Required 
Rating 
Average 
Perform Software Updates 5.00 
Configure automatic Software Updates 4.75 
Register IP address in OpenIPAM 4.46 
Install/configure firewall software 4.40 
Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater) 3.73 
Disable the local Guest account 3.43 
Install computer owner's various software products 3.17 
Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration) 3.00 
Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account 2.65 
Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account 2.50 
Rename local administrator account 2.50 
Disable administrator account 2.00 
Recommended  
Install/configure anti-virus software 3.64 
Employ a backup solution (e.g., Time Machine, store-to-network, portable external drive) 2.83 
Configure services to utilize non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop) 2.80 
Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia) 2.58 
Employ security-related group policies (i.e., join Open Directory domain) 2.57 
Configure power management options 2.57 
Install/configure anti-malware software 2.56 
Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in) 2.48 
Install/configure SCCM 2.47 
Configure Permitted Applications 2.20 
Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history 2.14 
Optional  
Install third-party web browsers (e.g., FireFox) 3.52 
Reformat hard drive and install Mac OS X from scratch 2.89 
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Convert file system to other file structure (e.g., UFS) 1.92 
Install Windows via virtual machine (e.g., Parallels, VMWare Fusion) 1.92 
Rename the local Guest account 1.89 
Configure Simple Finder 1.71 
Install Windows via BootCamp 1.63 
Encrypt the hard drive 1.13 
 
 Macintosh High Security Setup 
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the inclusion 
of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional. 
 Rating 
Average 
Perform Software Updates 5.00 
Configure automatic Software Updates 4.75 
Register IP address in OpenIPAM 4.46 
Install/configure firewall software 4.40 
Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater) 3.73 
Disable the local Guest account 3.43 
Install computer owner's various software products 3.17 
Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration) 3.00 
Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account 2.65 
Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account 2.50 
Rename local administrator account 2.50 
Disable administrator account 2.00 
Configure Simple Finder 1.71 
Encrypt the hard drive 1.13 
Configure Permitted Applications 2.20 
  
Install/configure anti-virus software 3.64 
Employ a backup solution (e.g., Time Machine, store-to-network, portable external drive) 2.83 
Configure services to utilize non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop) 2.80 
Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia) 2.58 
Employ security-related group policies (i.e., join Open Directory domain) 2.57 
Configure power management options 2.57 
Install/configure anti-malware software 2.56 
Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in) 2.48 
Install/configure SCCM 2.47 
Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history 2.14 
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Install third-party web browsers (e.g., FireFox) 3.52 
Reformat hard drive and install Mac OS X from scratch 2.89 
Convert file system to other file structure (e.g., UFS) 1.92 
Install Windows via virtual machine (e.g., Parallels, VMWare Fusion) 1.92 
Rename the local Guest account 1.89 
Install Windows via BootCamp 1.63 
 
 
Windows & Macintosh Ongoing Maintenance 
Note: The following recommendation is generic for both Windows and Macintosh systems, but some 
procedures may be OS-specific. Only the procedures in the top tier (orange) are considered minimum 
requirements; the inclusion of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional. 
 
 Rating 
Average 
Patch OS with available updates 4.95 
Patch third-party software with available updates 4.37 
Perform automated / scheduled anti-virus scans 4.03 
  
Disconnect unused network connections 3.79 
Perform regular data backups 3.67 
Check for unknown file shares 3.59 
Check for unknown user accounts 3.50 
Perform automated / scheduled anti-malware scans 3.46 
Check and confirm the integrity of data backups 3.34 
Remove unused programs 3.26 
Regularly defragment the hard drive 3.17 
Perform manual anti-malware scans 3.00 
  
Free up wasted space (e.g., Disk Cleanup) 2.94 
Perform manual anti-virus scans 2.83 
Regularly run hard drive repair utilities (e.g., chkdsk) 2.66 
Clear cache, cookies, and browser history and temporary Internet files 2.59 
Audit available anti-virus logs 2.58 
Audit available operating system logs 2.39 
Audit available anti-malware logs 2.38 
Audit available firewall logs 2.27 
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Utilize third-party registry maintenance tools (e.g., Registry Mechanic) 2.11 
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APPENDIX C: Interview Questions 
1. What are the goals for the task force? 
2. What do you think the task force produced? 
3. Why do you think that USU needs the computer 
security standards? 
4. To what end do you think the task force can:  
A. Achieve the common task? 
B. Work as a team? 
C. Meet individual (department) needs? 
5. How do you think the task force used the following 
ideas? 
 Effective groups? evaluated the validity of 
opinions 
 Effective groups? analyzed possible solutions 
thoroughly  
 Based their decisions on reasonable premises 
 Leaders encouraged constructive arguments  
6. Did the final conclusions match your expectations? 
7. Did you agree with the final conclusions?   
8. Where were the final conclusions lacking? 
A.  Where was their strength? 
9. Is there anything you would change about the group 
or its interpretation of the needs of the 
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university? 
10. How do you think that the university will change 
because of these recommendations? 
11. How do you think the university will implement 
these recommendations?  
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APPENDIX D: Biography of Subjects 
These subjects came from a variety of backgrounds: one 
was a musician in the military for 20 years; one was an 
electrical engineer who started fiddling with computers in 
his later life; another was a traditional computer science 
major who always knew that working in computing 
environments was what he wanted to do.  
Subject A was the CIO of the organization. His 
executive responsibilities included providing strategic 
information systems direction to the institution, as well 
as focusing the efforts of approximately 90 full time 
employees and a multimillion-dollar budget in support of 
the University’s mission. He held a doctoral degree in 
Education, specializing in Management Information Systems, 
a Business masters degree, and a Bachelors degree in 
Computer Engineering. His focus over the past three years 
was a strategic and comprehensive restructuring of all 
information systems, services, and policies, focusing on 
benefit to the overall institution. This effort created a 
successful unified approach to a broad range of information 
systems and services. In addition to his executive roles, 
he enjoyed teaching strategic IS management, technology, e-
commerce, and financial topics, presenting by invitation 
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nationally, as well as teaching at USU and the University 
of Phoenix. His approach to management was to simply have 
his employees call him by his first name. He describes 
himself as “an average father of five, who just happens to 
be able to explain a lot of acronyms. People enjoy [his] 
humor and ability to share useful information with everyone, 
especially non-techies!” 
Subject B was formerly the director of information 
technology marketing and was promoted to director of 
special projects. He was previously responsible for the 
marketing, communication and training with Information 
Technology at Utah State University. In this role, he 
coordinated the Network Managers meetings, encompassing all 
the IT Professionals at the University. He held a Bachelors 
degree in Computer Science and a Masters in Instructional 
Technology. Since 2001, he was the Senior Instructional 
Designer at the Faculty Assistance Center for Teaching, a 
technology center for faculty. He enjoyed working with 
faculty to help them integrate technology into their 
teaching. 
As director of special projects, Subject B was chair 
of the committee to search for new technology solutions to 
ongoing organizational problems. His project was the 
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development of a campus-wide voice over IP system. 
Subject C was the head of university information 
technology security. He started one of the first full-time 
dedicated information technology security teams in the 
state. He fondly recalled childhood memories of riding a 
tricycle back and forth on the USU campus. He wanted to 
stay at USU for as long as he could remember, and as a 
result, most of his reward was simply participating at USU. 
To quote: “I pestered the people who were IT years and 
years ago, checked on them every month asking if they had a 
job or so. Every week or two for several months until they 
finally offered me an entry-level job, and that was almost 
thirty years ago. So I’ve been doing IT ever since.”    
Back in the days when Subject C got that first job, 
computers were still using punch cards. He started at the 
mainframes, helped run the early forms of the USU help desk, 
and helped manage the earliest computer labs, CPM machines, 
MS-DOS machines, and Windows machines. At the time of his 
interview he used Linux as his primary operating system. At 
one time, he was involved in telecommunications. That was 
where he finally learned the basics of the scientific 
method--how to test things and how to do diagnostics and 
debugging. That revelation strongly affected his career, 
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leading him into more complicated environments and the 
management of more complicated systems at USU. He stated: 
“So I’m not here, for the most part, not because they pay 
me, or because that’s where I could get work. I’m here 
because this is where I wanted to be.”   
Subject D was with the organization for over 20 years. 
He graduated from USU with a Bachelor in Computer Science. 
He loved computer science so much that he stayed with the 
department and formed one of the first college-specific IT 
departments. At the time of his interview, he managed a lab 
with over 150 computers. Of those 150, the majority used 
the Microsoft Windows operating system, four were Apple Mac 
OS X based Mackintoshes, and eight used different 
distributions of Linux. He also managed all the computers 
for the computer science department.  
As part of his duties, Subject D also oversaw student 
lab managers. They helped him run the day-to-day operations 
of his computer lab. He stated that they are responsible 
for maintaining a sense of presence to help keep the users 
of the lab mindful of their actions. He described his 
faculty as “knowledgeable,” and because there are concerned 
experts in the field, they maintained their own systems. 
His hobbies included amateur radio and telecommunications. 
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Subject E managed the labs in the College of 
Humanities. He was with the college for five years. His 
training happened mainly on the job, starting when he was a 
student intern with the research laboratory performing 
desktop support for the scientists. His current 
responsibilities included managing two major computer labs 
in the English Department consisting of 48 computers and 
one major lab in the Journalism department consisting of 20 
computers. He also managed various small labs for other 
departments, each with 2 to 5 computers. His labs were 
split 90 percent Microsoft Windows to 10 percent Apple OS X, 
with no installations of Linux. Subject E oversaw two 
student interns that not only helped out in his lab but 
also covered some basic desktop support for the employees 
of the college. He was still working on his undergraduate 
degree and continued to dabble in computer gaming.  
Subject F came into computers through a very different 
path. After completing 18 years in the Marines as a 
musician, he realized that he would need a new skill set 
for civilian life. He used the G.I. Bill to formally train 
as a musician and found himself attending the Open Source 
and Free Software Club at Utah State University. He stated 
that he always had an attraction to technology, which 
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started in the military and grew once he came to college. 
He added computer science as a major and graduated with 
degrees in both music and computer science. The focus of 
his undergraduate studies was open source software. 
During his undergraduate studies, Subject F was hired 
by the College of Education as a second to the primary 
technology specialist. He quickly became the go-to guy in 
the college for Unix-based operating systems. His use of 
Unix-based operating systems led him to become the server 
and lab manager for the Instructional Technology department. 
Subject F’s computer lab consisted of 30 Apple Macintosh 
computers. He stated, “Education has always been 
predominantly Mac; it seemed only natural to provide a Mac-
based solution for our education environment.”  While the 
primary use of these computers was to run Mac OS X 
applications, he also configured them to dual boot with 
Microsoft Windows. However, the Windows side was not 
directly connected to the servers. Subject F was the only 
support for his lab, and he used Apple-based security tools 
to help him manage it. He recently was married and was 
expecting a new child in May 2012. 
The final subject, Subject G, was the manager for all 
the open access labs on the Logan campus. His 369 computers 
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were spread across 7 computer labs with another 20 
computers coming on-line in the upcoming year. Most of the 
computers were Windows-based PCs, while 60 of the lab 
computers were Apple Macintosh computers. 
Subject G was also the Manager of Information 
Technology Services for Utah State University. He graduated 
from Utah State University with a degree in Administrative 
Systems and Business Administration with an emphasis in 
Computer Science. For the past 24 years, Subject G managed, 
maintained, and provided technical and customer services to 
students, faculty, and staff at Utah State University. 
As a part of his position, Subject G maintained the 
responsibility of managing and maintaining seven open-
access computer labs, in which he hired and managed 85 
student workers. Subject G continued to dedicate his time 
in assisting Utah State University students, in pursuit of 
their academic goals, by providing state-of-the-art 
computing technology, software, and hands on experiences. 
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Robert F. Houghton 
838 Hillcrest Ave 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435) 363-7451 
E-mail: bob.houghton@gmail.com 
                                                                                                                                                      
OBJECTIVE 
 
To obtain a position where I can use my expertise to support all facets of computer networks, 
domains, and workstations. 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
Utah State University, Vice President for Information Technology 
February 2011 – Present 
Network Security Specialists 
● Created and implemented system of NetFlow data generators and collectors 
using open-source tools across the entire USU Network 
● Created and implemented internal PCI audit procedures including virtual and 
physical penetration testing. 
● Created and implemented an Intrusion Detection System using Snort 
● Created custom Snort rules for USU sensitive systems 
● Implemented upgrade to Nessus scanner and created new scan policies 
● Installed and configured custom border firewall rules 
 
Utah State University, Caine College of the Arts 
July 2010 – January 2011 
Systems Administrator 
● Led division of IT resources between the College of Humanities and Social 
Sciences and the Caine College of the Arts 
● Created College IT five-year plan using limited budget resources, including 
outsourcing most IT needs from the college to the central IT teams 
 
Utah State University, College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences 
January 2006 – June 2010 
Associate Systems Administrator  
● Composed university wide security policies 
● Co-chaired university committee to standardize policies across colleges 
● Installed, configured, and administered System Center Configuration Manager in 
a trusted multi-domain environment 
● Installed, configured, and administered Apple Remote Desktop and Task Server 
across Windows 2003 Active Directory Domain  
● Analyzed, documented and tracked security events across the College 
● Configured and deployed new VMWare-based solutions for our server needs 
● Integrated Mac OS X and Linux into a Windows 2003 Domain Environment 
● Created and maintained Group Policies for Windows 2003 Active Directory 
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Utah State University Research Foundation, North Logan, UT 
July 2003 – December 2005 
IT Support 
● Provided fast and reliable desktop support 
● Installed and configured workstations 
● Troubleshot network problems 
● Advised and performed workstation upgrades 
 
Computer Solutions, Santa Rosa, CA 
May 1999 – January 2002 
Head Technician 
● Built custom computers for clients 
● Provided support for client computers and networks 
● Installed and maintained various database programs for clients 
● Built and installed Microsoft NT 4.0 and 2000 networks and servers 
● Advised and performed network upgrades 
● Maintained Novell 5.0 server 
 
 
CERTIFICATION 
2012. International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium, Palm Harbor, FL. 
Systems Security Certified Practioner (SSCP) 
 
2005. Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington 
MCSE:S certification on Windows Server 2003 
 
EDUCATION  
2013. Utah State University, Logan Utah 
Doctor of Philosophy in Management Information Systems 
 
2008. Utah State University, Logan, Utah 
Masters of Science in Management Information Systems 
 
2006.  Utah State University, Logan, Utah 
Bachelors of Music in Music, Cum Laude 
 
2001. Santa Rosa Junior College, Santa Rosa, California 
Graduate, Associates of Arts with Honors 
 
 
